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inflation targeters generally dominates performance of emerging-economy inflation targeters and is
similar to that of industrial non-inflation targeting countries.
Frederic S. Mishkin
Governor Frederic Mishkin
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System







Central Bank of Chile
Agustinas 1180
Santiago, Chile





Since New Zealand adopted inflation targeting in 1990, a steadily growing number of industrial 
and emerging economies have explicitly adopted an inflation target as their nominal anchor. Eight 
industrial countries and thirteen emerging economies had full-fledged inflation targeting in place in 
early 2005. Many other emerging economies are planning to adopt inflation targeting in the near 
future. This trend has triggered an intensifying debate over whether inflation targeting makes a 
difference. Opinions diverge widely over whether central banks are better off after they adopt 
inflation (forecast) targeting as an explicit and exclusive anchor for conducting monetary policy. 
Analysts are demanding hard evidence that inflation targeting improves macroeconomic 
performance relative to countries without explicit inflation targeting.  
Empirical evidence on the direct link between inflation targeting and particular measures of 
economic performance generally provides some support for the view that inflation targeting is 
associated with an improvement in overall economic performance.1 This conclusion is derived from 
the following four results:2  
—Inflation levels, inflation volatility, and interest rates have declined after countries adopted 
inflation targeting. 
—Output volatility has not worsened after the adoption of inflation targeting; if anything, it has 
improved. 
—Exchange rate pass-through seems to be attenuated by the adoption of inflation targeting. 
—The fall in inflation levels and volatility, interest rates, and output volatility is part of a 
worldwide trend in the 1990s, and inflation targeters have not done better in terms of these 
variables or in terms of exchange rate pass-through than nontargeting industrialized countries such 
as Germany or the United States.  
Although these results suggest that inflation targeting is beneficial, they are less conclusive than 
first appears. Ball and Sheridan (2005), in one of the few empirical papers critical of inflation 
targeting, argue that inflation targeting does not make a difference in industrial countries. They 
claim that the apparent success of inflation targeting countries simply reflects regression toward the 
mean: that is, inflation will fall faster in countries that start with high inflation than in countries 
with an initially low inflation rate. Since the countries that adopted inflation targeting generally had 
higher initial inflation rates, their larger decline in inflation merely reflects a general tendency of all 
countries, both targeters and nontargeters, to achieve better inflation and output performance in the 
1990s, when inflation targeting was adopted. 
Ball and Sheridan’s findings are heavily disputed by Hyvonen (2004), Vega and Winkelried 
(2005), IMF (2005), and Batini and Laxton (forthcoming), who provide evidence—based on using 
samples that include emerging countries and different specifications and estimation techniques—
that inflation levels, persistence, and volatility are lower in inflation-targeting countries than in 
nontargeters. However, Ball and Sheridan’s paper does raise a serious issue about the empirical 
literature on inflation targeting. The adoption of inflation targeting is clearly an endogenous choice, 
as is pointed out by Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel (2002) and Gertler (2005). The finding that better 
performance is associated with inflation targeting thus may not imply that inflation targeting causes 
this better performance. 
                                                       
1. Roger and Stone (2005) reach this conclusion. 
2. For evidence supporting these first four results, see Bernanke and others (1999), Corbo, Landerretche, and Schmidt-
Hebbel (2002), Neumann and von Hagen (2002), Hu (2003), Truman (2003), and Ball and Sheridan (2005). There is also some 
mildly favorable evidence on the impact of inflation targeting on sacrifice ratios. Bernanke and others (1999) do not find that 
sacrifice ratios in industrialized countries fell with the adoption of inflation targeting, while Corbo, Landerretche, and 
Schmidt-Hebbel (2002) conclude, based on a larger sample of inflation targeters, that inflation targeting did lead to an 
improvement in sacrifice ratios. Cohen, Gonzalez, and Powell (2003) also find that inflation targeting leads to nominal 
exchange rate movements that are more responsive to real shocks than nominal shocks. This might indicate that inflation 
targeting can help the nominal exchange rate act as a shock absorber for the real economy.   2 
The fourth result above—namely, that the inflation and output performance of inflation-
targeting countries improves but does not surpass countries like Germany and the United States—
also suggests that what really matters for successful monetary policy is establishing a strong 
nominal anchor. While inflation targeting is one way to achieve this, it is not the only way. Germany 
was able to create a strong nominal anchor with its monetary targeting procedure (see Bernanke and 
Mishkin, 1992; Mishkin and Posen, 1997; Bernanke and others, 1999; Neumann and von Hagen, 
2002). In the United States, the strong nominal anchor has been Alan Greenspan (see, for example, 
Mishkin, 2000). It is not at all clear that inflation targeting would have improved performance 
during the Greenspan era, although it might well do so in the future if the United States is not as 
fortunate with choices of Fed chairmen like Greenspan and Bernanke (Mishkin, 2005). Furthermore, 
as emphasized in Calvo and Mishkin (2003) and Sims (2005), an inflation target alone is not capable 
of establishing a strong nominal anchor if the government pursues irresponsible fiscal policy or 
inadequate prudential supervision of the financial system, which might then be prone to a financial 
crisis. 
Empirical evidence that focuses on whether inflation targeting strengthens the nominal anchor 
may be even more telling about the possible benefits of inflation targeting. Recent research has 
found the following additional results: 
—Evidence that the adoption of inflation targeting leads to an immediate fall in inflation 
expectations is not strong.3 
—Inflation persistence, however, is lower for countries that have adopted inflation targeting than 
for countries that have not. 
—Inflation expectations appear to be more anchored for inflation targeters than nontargeters: 
that is, inflation expectations react less to shocks to actual inflation for targeters than nontargeters, 
particularly at longer horizons.4 
These results suggest that once inflation targeting has been in place for a while, it does make a 
difference by anchoring inflation expectations and thus strengthening the nominal anchor. Inflation 
targeting could therefore strengthen the nominal anchor in the United States even beyond what was 
achieved under “maestro” Greenspan. Recent theory on optimal monetary policy, sometimes called 
the new neoclassical synthesis (Woodford, 2003; Goodfriend and King, 1997), shows that establishing 
a strong nominal anchor is a crucial element in successful monetary policy. Consequently, the 
evidence on anchoring inflation expectations bolsters the case for the adoption of inflation targeting. 
Our survey of the debate on whether inflation targeting matters indicates that open questions 
remain, particularly with regard to other dimensions of comparative macroeconomic performance in 
inflation-targeting countries, both over time and in comparison with nontargeting countries. Are the 
inflation level and the volatility of inflation and output lower in inflation-targeting countries? Do 
monetary policy and macroeconomic performance variables respond differently to shocks under 
inflation-targeting than under other monetary policy regimes? Is monetary policy efficient under 
inflation-targeting? Are inflation-targeting central banks more accurate in hitting their targets than 
nontargeters in maintaining or achieving stable inflation? 
This paper addresses these questions systematically by applying a common methodological 
approach, across issues and throughout the paper, based on four methodological choices. First, we 
look for empirical evidence in a sample of twenty-one industrial and emerging inflation-targeting 
countries before and after their adoption of inflation targeting, and we compare their performance to 
a control group of thirteen industrial countries without inflation targeting (termed nontargeters). 
The macroeconomic and monetary policy performance of the nontargeters in this control group is 
among the best in the world, raising the odds against finding evidence of better performance among 
inflation-targeting countries. Second, we distinguish between two types of inflation-targeting 
regimes, one in which inflation targets are still converging to the long-run goal for inflation and one 
                                                       
3. For example, Bernanke and others (1999) and Levin, Natalucci, and Piger (2004) do not find that inflation targeting 
leads to an immediate fall in expected inflation, but Johnson (2002, 2003) finds some evidence that expected inflation falls 
after the announcement of inflation targets. 
4. Gürkaynak, Levin, and Swanson (forthcoming); Levin, Natalucci, and Piger (2004); Castelnuovo, Nicoletti-Altimari, 
and Palenzuela (2003).   3 
in which the inflation target is stationary. This distinction is important because the strength of the 
nominal anchor may vary depending on whether inflation targets are stable. Third, we test for 
differences in the group behavior of inflation targeters and nontargeters—and for changes between 
pre- and post-targeting periods among targeters—making statistical inferences from panel data 
estimations, panel vector autoregressive models, and panel impulse responses. Finally, to exploit the 
rich available data and identify dynamic patterns, we use a high-frequency sample of quarterly data, 
covering the 1989–2004 period and subperiods. 
Section 1 of the paper describes more closely the two samples of inflation targeters and 
nontargeters and presents comparative descriptive statistics on their inflation and growth 
performance. The following sections test for differences in performance between targeters and 
nontargeters and (for targeters) between pre- and post-targeting periods, along four dimensions. 
Section 2 revisits the question about differences in inflation behavior among country groups, 
extending previous research on the same issue to a country panel and considering alternative 
estimation methods and control groups. Section 3 tests for differences in the country groups’ dynamic 
response of inflation to oil price and exchange rate shocks and of domestic interest rates to 
international interest rate shocks. Section 4 measures differences in macroeconomic performance 
(output and inflation volatility) and monetary policy efficiency. Section 5 reports differences between 
country groups in meeting inflation targets or objectives. Section 6 offers concluding remarks. 
 
 
1. DESCRIPTIVE INFLATION AND OUTPUT STATISTICS  
 
Inflation targeting was started by New Zealand in 1990, with several industrial countries and 
emerging economies following in subsequent years. Our sample of inflation-targeting countries 
comprises eight industrial countries and thirteen emerging economies that had full-fledged inflation 
targeting in place in late 2004.5 
Dating the adoption of inflation targeting is not uncontroversial, particularly in emerging 
economies that started a version of inflation targeting termed partial inflation targeting. Under 
partial inflation targeting, countries often maintained an additional nominal anchor (typically an 
exchange rate band), did not satisfy key preconditions for inflation targeting, and did not put in place 
formal features of inflation targeting (such as formalizing monetary policy decisions or publishing an 
inflation report with inflation forecasts). In contrast, under full-fledged inflation targeting, the 
inflation target is the only nominal anchor (although exchange rate interventions could be present), 
and the central bank pursues most formal policy and transparency features observed under best-
practice inflation targeting. 
Here we follow much of the previous literature (for example, Corbo, Landerretche, and Schmidt-
Hebbel, 2002; Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel, 2002; Roger and Stone, 2005) in dating the adoption of 
inflation targeting with the start of either partial or full-fledged inflation targeting, in opposition to 
work that considers inflation targeting as starting only with full-fledged targeting (for example, IMF, 
2005; Batini, and Laxton, forthcoming). For the reasons mentioned above, however, we identify two 
distinct post-adoption periods, based on the stationarity of the inflation target itself. During target 
convergence, inflation targets are adjusted downward, typically for calendar years, and they are 
based on annual or multi-annual announcements. During target stationarity, inflation targets are 
fixed at a constant level or range for an indefinite future, although some countries occasionally make 
slight adjustments to the target.6  An important advantage of using converging versus stationary 
targets to identify relevant post-targeting periods is that this distinction is based on an observable 
feature that is precisely dated, whereas the partial/full-fledged dichotomy is based on more 
subjective characteristics and dating. 
                                                       
5. We therefore exclude Finland and Spain, which adopted inflation targeting in 1993 and 1995, respectively, before 
adopting the euro in 1999.  
6. Countries that have exceptionally and only marginally adjusted their stationary target levels or ranges include New 
Zealand and the United Kingdom.   4 
Table 1 summarizes the information on inflation-targeting countries for the world population of 
inflation targeters. The data sample used in this paper starts with the first quarter of 1989 and 
extends through the fourth quarter of 2004. Pre-targeting sample periods range from one year (New 
Zealand, the most senior inflation targeter) to twelve years (Iceland, Norway, Hungary, and the 
Philippines, the most recent targeters). Target convergence periods also vary significantly in 
extension, from no convergence (for example, Australia and Thailand) to eleven years of convergence 
(Israel). The length of the stationary-target period is also heterogeneous, extending from one year 
(Poland) to twelve years (New Zealand).  
 
[table 1 here] 
 
Our most recent data on inflation target levels (or midpoints of target ranges) show little country 
variation. For the eight stationary industrial countries, the average inflation target level was 2.2 
percent in 2005. Among emerging economies, the average inflation target level that year was 3.0 
percent for the subsample of eight inflation targeters with a stationary target and 3.6 percent for the 
subsample of inflation targeters that were still converging toward future stationary target levels in 
2004.  
Figure 1 depicts inflation targets since the adoption of inflation targeting and twelve-month 
consumer price index (CPI) inflation rates for every inflation targeter, based on quarterly data for 
1989–2004. Visual inspection of the absolute differences between inflation and target levels suggests 
that inflation-targeting countries have been successful in meeting their targets. Section 5 tests this 
hypothesis more systematically and compares the finding with a control group of nontargeters. 
 
[figure 1 here] 
 
Our control group of nontargeters comprises a selective set of thirteen industrial countries that 
are at the international frontier of macroeconomic management and performance: Austria, Belgium, 
Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, 
and the United States. In choosing this control group, we reduce the probability of finding evidence 
of better comparative performance under inflation targeting, considering that the world population 
of twenty-one inflation targeters encompasses a more heterogeneous country set in terms of past 
performance, current macroeconomic institutions, and income levels.7 
Figure 2 shows that inflation targeters and nontargeters had very different annual inflation 
rates in the late 1980s and early 1990s.8  However, as time passed and inflation targeting was 
adopted in the 1990s, the inflation gap between inflation targeters and nontargeters fell almost 
monotonically and was almost closed by 2004. This inflation convergence is largely due to the 
massive decline in inflation among inflation-targeting emerging economies (figure 3). 
 
[figures 2 and 3 here] 
 
Comparative descriptive statistics on inflation performance confirm these facts (table 2). 
Inflation targeters reduced their average inflation rates from 12.6 percent before the adoption of 
inflation targeting to 4.4 percent after the adoption. Inflation declined to 6.0 percent in the post-
adoption convergence and then to 2.3 percent after attaining stationary targets. Inflation-targeting 
emerging economies have recorded 6.0 percent inflation since adopting inflation targeting, while the 
corresponding figure is only 2.2 percent in inflation-targeting industrial countries. The latter figure 
is very close to the average 2.1 percent inflation recorded among nontargeters since 1997. We 
observe a similar pattern for inflation volatility (measured by the standard deviation of inflation). 
                                                       
7. Ten of the thirteen countries in the control group joined the euro area in 1999 and therefore do not pursue an 
independent monetary policy for a significant part of our 1989–2004 sample period. While this may be a disadvantage, we 
think it is of less concern than the problems—and less relevant results—that would arise if our control group was made up of 
developing countries.  
8. The country sample of inflation targeters depicted in figure 2 is held fixed, including all years before the adoption of 
inflation targeting in each of the twenty-one countries.    5 
While inflation volatility in industrial inflation targeters is twice the level recorded in nontargeters, 
inflation persistence is slightly lower in industrial targeters than in nontargeters. The next section 
more systematically tests for significant differences in inflation performance between inflation 
targeters and nontargeters, controlling for possible endogeneity of the inflation-targeting regime. 
 
[table 2 here] 
 
Comparative descriptive statistics on the volatility and persistence of output growth and the 
output gap reflect the following trends (table 3). Emerging inflation targeters—in contrast to 
industrial inflation targeters—have achieved a significant reduction in output growth volatility and 
output gap volatility. Nontargeters also achieved a significant reduction in both volatility measures 
after 1997, to levels that are below those recorded by industrial inflation targeters. However, output 
persistence, like inflation persistence, is lower in stationary-target inflation targeters than in 
nontargeters after 1997. 
[table 3 here] 
 
 
2. COMPARATIVE INFLATION PERFORMANCE 
 
Comparing inflation performance in inflation-targeting countries and nontargeting countries has 
recently received increased attention (Ball and Sheridan, 2005; Vega and Winkelried, 2005; IMF, 
2005). All these works are based only on cross-section evidence, but they differ significantly in the 
choice of control groups of nontargeters and in estimation techniques. Not surprisingly, results also 
differ significantly, as summarized below. In this section we focus on the comparative performance of 
inflation levels, extending the previous literature by considering alternative control groups, a panel 
data set, and alternative estimation techniques. 
In line with previous research, we specify inflation as a weighted average of its long-term or 
underlying mean and its recent past represented by its lagged value, consistent with a standard 
partial-adjustment specification:  
 








where π is the observed twelve-month CPI inflation rate, π* is the unobserved long-term average 
twelve-month CPI inflation rate, parameter λ is the weight attached to long-term inflation, and ε is a 
stochastic disturbance term. Consistent with a panel sample, subindexes i and t denote country units 
and time periods. 
The unobserved long-term inflation rate is allowed to differ between inflation targeters and 
nontargeters, according to the following specification based on an inflation-targeting-regime dummy 
variable and controlling for country- and time-specific effects: 
 






t ,   (2) 
 
where D is the inflation-targeting-regime dummy, β is its coefficient, α is a country fixed effect, and δ 
is a time fixed effect. For inflation-targeting countries, Di,t  is set equal to 0 for periods before 
inflation-targeting adoption and 1 for periods of inflation targeting; for nontargeters, Di,t is equal to 0 
for all periods. 
Substituting equation 2 into equation 1 yields the following expression: 
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i,t .   (3) 
   6 
By subtracting lagged inflation from both sides of equation 3 and taking t and t – 1 as the periods 
before and after the inflation-targeting adoption date, we arrive at the following difference-in-
difference cross-section specification, which is used by Ball and Sheridan (2005) and IMF (2005) to 
test for inflation performance differences between inflation targeters and nontargeters: 
 










,   (4) 
 
where πi,post (πi,pre) is average observed inflation in the period after (before) the inflation-targeting 
adoption date; γ1, γ2, and γ3 are reduced-form coefficients; and μi is a stochastic disturbance term. 
Table 4 summarizes the cross-section results on comparative inflation performance reported by 
the previous literature. Ball and Sheridan (2005) reject any long-term differences between inflation 
targeters and nontargeters regarding inflation mean, volatility, and persistence, for a sample of 
seven industrial inflation targeters and thirteen industrial nontargeters. They attribute inflation 
performance improvement in inflation-targeting industrial countries over time to reversion to the 
mean after the low performance of the 1980s, as reflected by their reported significance of lagged 
inflation (πi,pre).9 
 
[table 4 here] 
 
IMF (2005) comes to the opposite conclusion using a similar ordinary least squares (OLS) cross-
section estimation technique. The treatment and control groups differ radically from those used by 
Ball and Sheridan, however: the study compares inflation performance in thirteen developing 
inflation targeters to a control group of twenty-two developing countries. They find that inflation 
targeting has helped developing inflation targeters reduce annual long-term inflation rates by 4.8 
percent and lower long-term inflation volatility by 3.6 percent. 
Finally, Vega and Winkelried (2005) use a matching (propensity score) technique applied to 
cross-country data for a treatment sample of twenty-three industrial and developing inflation 
targeters and a control group of eighty-six industrial and developing nontargeters. They report that 
targeters have lower long-term annual inflation rates ranging from 2.6 percent to 4.8 percent and 
lower long-term inflation volatilities by 1.5 percent to 2.0 percent. The similarity of Vega and 
Winkelried’s results to those reported in the IMF suggests that sample differences weigh more 
heavily than differences in estimation techniques in the results reported by the three cited studies. 
Next we extend the tests for differences in inflation performance reported by previous studies 
along three dimensions. We add the time dimension of the data to the cross-country dimension, 
focusing on a large panel sample of quarterly data for sixteen years and thirty-four countries. We 
check the robustness of our results by reporting results based on different estimation techniques 
(OLS and IV estimations). Finally, we report different results by varying the composition of our 
inflation-targeting treatment group (separating industrial and emerging-market inflation targeters 
and stationary-target and converging-target inflation targeters) and of our nontargeting control 
group (considering different combinations of the nontargeting sample and the pre-targeting sample). 
To facilitate comparison with previous studies, we start by estimating equation 4, using 
quarterly data from 1989–2004 for our full sample of twenty-one developing and industrial inflation 
targeters and thirteen industrial nontargeters.10  The results suggest that inflation has been 1 
percent higher in inflation-targeting countries than in nontargeters, on average, as reflected by the 
coefficient of the contemporaneous inflation-targeting dummy variable (table 5). Given the estimated 
coefficient on pre-targeting (pre-1997) inflation in inflation targeters (nontargeters), equal to –0.85, 
the long-term average difference in inflation between inflation targeters and nontargeters is 
                                                       
9. Hyvonen (2004) disputes this interpretation by reporting strong evidence for inflation divergence among industrial 
countries in previous decades.  
10. For inflation targeters, the pre-and post-adoption periods are identified in table 2. For nontargeters, we follow the 
convention of previous studies in using an arbitrary cut-off date that is consistent with the targeters’ average adoption date. 
In our sample, this date is the fourth quarter of 1996.   7 
estimated at 1.2 percent.11 This finding of 1 percent higher inflation in inflation-targeting countries 
is estimated conditional on the inclusion of the highly significant pre-targeting (pre-1997) inflation 
rate. This estimate is much smaller than the unconditional inflation difference between inflation 
targeters and nontargeters for the inflation-targeting (post-1997) period, equal to 2.3 percent (the 
difference between 4.37 percent and 2.07 percent reported in table 2). 
 
[table 5 here] 
 
Our result stands in contrast with the negative inflation differences between inflation targeters 
and nontargeters found by Vega and Winkelried (for developing and industrial countries) and the 
IMF (for developing countries only) and the zero differences in Ball and Sheridan (for industrial 
countries only). This suggests that differences in results are mostly a reflection of inflation-targeting 
and nontargeting country group composition. Of all the reported studies, our sample composition is 
the most stringent against finding favorable effects of the inflation-targeting regime, because our 
inflation targeters comprise the world population of industrial and developing countries, while our 
control group encompasses only high-achieving industrial nontargeters. Not surprisingly, we find a 
significantly higher average inflation level in inflation-targeting countries, conditional on their pre-
targeting (or pre-1997) inflation levels. 
We now proceed to extend the above cross-country studies by exploiting both the country and 
time dimensions of our full panel sample, using both OLS and instrumental variables (IV) estimation 
techniques. We start by focusing on our full treatment sample comprising all inflation targeters, but 
considering three different data sets with alternative control groups. Control group 1 includes all 
1989–2004 observations for our thirteen nontargeting countries and the pre-targeting observations of 
all subsequent inflation targeters, implying a large panel dataset of 1,942 quarterly observations for 
the full sample. Control group 2 covers all 1989–2004 observations for our thirteen nontargeting 
countries but excludes the pre-targeting observations of all subsequent inflation targeters; this 
implies a smaller panel of 1,420 quarterly observations for the full sample. Finally, control group 3 
encompasses all pre-targeting observations of all subsequent inflation targeters and excludes 
nontargeting countries; this generates a panel of 1,183 observations. 
We turn back to equation 3, which is the relevant specification for our panel sample. In contrast 
to equation 4 and the corresponding results reported in table 5, the regressors now include inflation 
lagged by one quarter and exclude inflation in the pre-targeting (pre-1997) period. For reference, we 
start by reporting pooled OLS results with time dummies, with one for each of the three control 
groups (columns 1, 3, and 5 in table 6). All subsequent results on inflation differences between 
country groups are conditional on the inclusion of lagged inflation and thus are not directly 
comparable to the differences in unconditional inflation means reported in table 2. 
 
[table 6 here] 
 
The results for control group 1 (first column in table 6) show that the impact of the inflation-
targeting regime is to reduce inflation by 0.1 percent per year, with a long-term effect (considering 
the coefficient estimate of lagged inflation) of –1.9 percent. Recall, however, that we include high pre-
targeting inflation levels among subsequent inflation targeters in control group 1. Dropping this 
subsample yields the results reported for control group 2 in column 3, which show no significant 
inflation difference between inflation targeters and nontargeters. The estimation presented in 
column 5 reinforces these results: inflation targeters’ long-term inflation is a significant 5 percent 
lower than their pre-targeting long-term inflation level. 
These OLS results may be biased because of endogeneity of the inflation-targeting regime to 
inflation. As shown by our previous research using a cross-section sample of inflation targeters and 
nontargeters (Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel, 2002), the adoption of inflation targeting is determined 
                                                       
11. This result must be qualified, however, because of the omission of country fixed effects and the possible endogeneity of 
the inflation-targeting-regime dummy, addressed below.    8 
by country-specific variables, including central bank independence, the fiscal surplus, and initial 
inflation. 
Given the lack of adequate instruments for the inflation-targeting regime variable for our full 
panel sample, we estimate a parsimonious first-stage specification for the inflation-targeting dummy 
as a function of its own lag and average pre-targeting (pre-1997) inflation for inflation targeters 
(nontargeters).12 The results for various panel samples of inflation targeters and nontargeters show 
that both variables are useful instruments of the inflation-targeting-regime dummy; we therefore 
use them in our subsequent IV estimations.13 
Returning to table 6, we report IV results for the preceding specification of the inflation 
difference in columns 2, 4, and 6.14 This exercise confirms the qualitative results of columns 1, 3, and 
5. When we use control group 1 (which includes the inflation targeters’ pre-targeting observations 
since 1989), inflation is lower among inflation targeters. The corresponding estimations for control 
group 2 show that this result vanishes, yielding no significant difference. With control group 3, 
however, the lower inflation among inflation targeters is magnified. 
We find for control groups 1 and 3 that both the contemporaneous and long-term effects of the 
inflation-targeting dummy on inflation differentials in inflation-targeting countries is larger for the 
IV estimations than for the OLS estimations (comparing columns 1 and 2 and columns 5 and 6). This 
suggests that the absolute size of the inflation-targeting dummy coefficient is biased downward in 
the OLS estimations, because it fails to take into account the endogeneity of inflation targeting to 
inflation. When we use IV, the estimated effect of inflation targeting is to lower long-run annual 
inflation by 4.8 percent (compared to control group 1) and by 5 percent (compared to control group 3). 
However, there is no significant inflation difference between inflation targeters and nontargeters 
(control group 2). 
To explore whether these results for our full treatment sample (including all industrial and 
emerging-market inflation targeters) are robust to considering different subsamples of inflation 
targeters, we divide the full treatment sample first into industrial and emerging-market inflation 
targeters and then into converging-target and stationary-target inflation targeters. Tables 7 and 8 
report the corresponding results for our three control groups, using only IV panel estimation 
techniques. As above, we infer that estimated inflation differences between inflation targeters and 
nontargeters depend largely on which control group is used. However, they also vary significantly 
with treatment groups—that is, across different subsamples of inflation targeters. 
 
[tables 7 and 8 here] 
 
The results for industrial inflation targeters show that inflation is numerically, but not 
significantly, lower in industrial inflation targeters than in control groups 1 and 3 (results in 
columns 1 and 5 of table 7). While this result may be surprising, recall that our econometric results 
are conditional on including the highly significant lagged inflation variable. In contrast, we find 
weak evidence (significant at the 10 percent level) that inflation in industrial inflation targeters is 
significantly lower than in nontargeters for control group 2—by 0.06 percent on impact and by 1.1 
percent in the long run. Considering its weak significance, this result is similar to Ball and 
Sheridan’s (2005) finding of no significant inflation difference for industrial countries, based on OLS 
cross-section results.  
                                                       
12. Some determinants of an inflation-targeting regime (like central bank independence measures) included in the 
Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel cross-section probit estimation for inflation targeting are not available for time series, while 
other determinants (such as the ratio of fiscal balance to GDP and trade openness measures) were found to be insignificant in 
our current panel data sample. 
13. Results of the first-stage regressions are available on request. 
14. We use time dummies in all IV specifications. For control groups 1 and 3, we also use country-specific dummies (fixed 
effects). We use a within-estimation technique to eliminate the bias that may arise from the correlation between the fixed 
effects and the regressors owing to the lags of the dependent variable. Finally, we do not use fixed effects for control group 2, 
since the inflation-targeting dummy would be perfectly correlated with the fixed effects. We therefore apply a standard pooled 
IV procedure to control for endogeneity in control group 2.   9 
The results for emerging inflation targeters point to a considerable gain in inflation. Compared 
with control groups 1 and 3, emerging inflation targeters record a large and significant reduction of 
inflation (table 7, columns 2 and 6), which is close to 0.8 percent on impact and 7.0 percent in the 
long term However, when compared with nontargeters only (control group 2 in column 4), emerging 
inflation targeters do not record inflation gains. 
The results for converging-target and stationary-target inflation targeters also confirm that the 
choice of treatment and control groups is crucial (see table 8). Our general result on control groups is 
upheld: inflation differences tend to favor inflation targeters only in comparison with control groups 
1 and 3. Inflation differences in favor of inflation targeters are found to be highly significant in 
converging inflation targeters and not significant in stationary targeters. 
The evidence on the comparative inflation performance of inflation targeters and nontargeters 
reported both here and in the previous literature thus shows that the effect of inflation targeting on 
inflation can go either way. Our findings suggest that the source of these differences lies in the use of 
heterogeneous control groups. The failure to use panel data techniques in previous studies prevents 
the separation of control groups across countries and time. By exploiting both the cross-section and 
time dimensions of our sample, we found that the largest difference in inflation performance between 
inflation targeters and nontargeters occurs when the treatment group is compared with its own pre-
targeting experience. This effect declines when nontargeting experiences are added to the control 
group, but it is still statistically significant. When the control group is restricted to nontargeting 
countries, however, we find no systematic, significant difference in inflation between inflation 
targeters and nontargeters. 
Further disaggregation of the treatment group into industrial and emerging inflation targeters, 
and into converging-target and stationary-target inflation targeters, yields mixed results. They 
confirm that results are highly dependent on the choice of control groups. They also suggest that 
emerging and converging-target inflation targeters record the largest gains in inflation reduction. 
Finally, industrial inflation targeters exhibit a statistically weak reduction in inflation relative to 
nontargeting industrial countries. 
 
 
3. INFLATION AND POLICY RESPONSE TO SHOCKS 
 
If inflation targeting improves the credibility of monetary policy and the anchoring of inflation 
expectations, then we would expect that inflation would respond less to oil price shocks under 
inflation targeting and there would be less of a pass-through effect from exchange rate shocks. As a 
result of increased credibility and reduced devaluation to inflation pass-through, inflation targeting 
may also reinforce monetary policy independence (that is, it may weaken the reaction of domestic 
interest rates to shocks in foreign rates). 
We therefore want to assess whether inflation targeters differ from nontargeters—and whether 
targeters differ pre- and post-targeting—in the response of inflation to shocks in oil prices and the 
exchange rate and the response of domestic interest rates to innovations in international interest 
rates. To test for differences, we adopt a comparative analysis of impulse response functions in 
different country samples, depending on whether a country has inflation targeting in place (in the 
spirit of the difference-in-differences approach). However, instead of using traditional country vector 
autoregressive (VAR) models, we use a panel VAR that allows us to use the larger data set on 
inflation targeters and nontargeters employed in this paper. 
Our approach to assessing the impact of inflation targeting on the responses described above is 
based on the analysis and comparison of aggregated impulse response functions in the following five 
groups of countries and periods: inflation targeters before the adoption of inflation targets; inflation 
targeters after the adoption of inflation targeting; inflation targeters after achieving stationary 
targets; nontargeters before 1997; and nontargeters after 1997. The first group—namely, inflation 
targeters in the period before they implemented inflation targeting—is characterized by a 
heterogeneous sample period, since it starts at the beginning of our sample (first quarter of 1989) but 
ends according to the date of adoption of inflation targeting in each country. The second group   10 
presents the opposite situation, in which the sample period is heterogeneous at the beginning but 
ends at the same period (fourth quarter of 2004). The third group, which is made up of inflation 
targeters that have achieved stationary targets, is a subsample of the full inflation-targeting group. 
The results for this subsample might differ from the full sample because the convergence period from 
the adoption of inflation targeting to a stationary target may not be characterized by high credibility. 
The full benefits of inflation targeting in achieving a strong nominal anchor might only be obtained 
after inflation targets become stationary. The fourth and fifth groups both encompass our sample of 
countries without inflation targeting, but they differ in their sample period. 
Once we have estimated the responses to shocks for each group (as described below), we compare 
those responses between different pairs of groups. Specifically, we are looking for significant 
differences (that is, statistically different from zero) between the responses before and after the 
adoption of inflation targeting in inflation targeters (group 1 versus group 2), before the adoption of 
inflation targeting and after the achievement of a stationary target (group 1 versus group 3), before 
and after 1997 in nontargeters (group 4 versus group 5), after inflation targeting in inflation 
targeters and after 1997 in nontargeters (group 2 versus group 5), and after the achievement of a 
stationary target and after 1997 in nontargeters (group 3 versus group 5). We also split our 
treatment group sample (inflation targeters) into industrial and emerging economies to check for 
possible differences in their performance.  
We use panel VAR techniques to estimate the impulse response functions for each group 
described above. This technique combines a traditional VAR approach with panel data. It allows us 
to exploit our rich information set and gain efficiency in the estimation. This methodology also allows 
for unobserved country heterogeneity and facilitates the exposition and analysis of aggregate 
results.15 To our knowledge, this technique has not been used in studies of inflation targeting. 
Following Love and Zicchino (2002), we allow for individual heterogeneity by introducing fixed 
effects. Since fixed effects are correlated with the regressors due to lags of the dependent variable, 
we use forward mean differencing (the Helmert procedure) to remove the mean of all the future 
observations available for each country. This technique supports the use of lagged regressors as 
instruments and estimates the coefficients by system generalized method of moments (GMM). 
Finally, we identify the responses to innovations in the system using the Choleski decomposition of 
the variance-covariance matrix of residuals, and we apply bootstrap methods to construct their 
confidence intervals. Since we cannot assume independence among our samples, we also use 
bootstrap methods to construct confidence intervals for differences in impulse response functions 
instead of simply taking their differences.16 
Our VAR system contains the following six variables (in this order): international oil price, 
international interest rate, output gap, inflation, interest rate, and nominal exchange rate. As is 
usual in any VAR estimation, the most exogenous variables enter first in the VAR. Since the model 
yields similar impulse response functions using two or more lags, we selected a lag order of two for 
reasons of parsimony. 
We start by discussing the impulse responses of inflation to oil price shocks (figures 4, 5, and 6) 
and exchange rate shocks (figures 7, 8, and 9), and end with the impulse responses of domestic to 
international interest rates (figures 10, 11, and 12).17 Each figure shows the dynamic response of one 
selected variable to a shock in another variable of the system. For example, the first cell (first row 
and first column) of figure 4 depicts the dynamic response of domestic inflation to an international 
oil price shock in inflation-targeting countries before they adopted inflation targeting. The response 
                                                       
15. For applied studies using panel VAR estimation, see Holtz-Eakin, Newey, and Rosen, 1988; Love and Zicchino, 2002; 
Miniane and Rogers, 2003.  
16. If we were simply to assume sample independence, the corresponding confidence intervals for differences would be 
narrower.  
17. We estimated impulse responses for other shocks (including inflation and output gap responses to interest rate shocks 
and interest rate responses to exchange-rate shocks) and tested for their differences across country groups, but the results 
were not relevant.   11 
of domestic inflation to an oil price shock equivalent to one standard deviation is 0.18 percent in 
quarter 0 (contemporaneous effect) and peaks at 0.40 percent in quarter 2 (after the shock).18 
Each row of cells in the figure focuses on a different comparison between the dynamic response of 
two sample groups. The first three rows report before-and-after comparisons—rows 1 and 2 for 
inflation targeters before and after they adopted inflation targeting, and row 3 for nontargeters 
before and after 1997. Rows 4 and 5 report comparisons across country groups: inflation targeters 
after adopting inflation targeting or after achieving a stationary target, respectively, are compared to 
nontargeters after 1997. For instance, the first row of figure 4 compares the response of inflation 
targeters before they adopted inflation targeting (first column) to the response of inflation targeters 
after they did so (second column). The third column reports the difference between the preceding 
responses—that is, the response in the second column minus the response in the first column. 
 
[figures 4, 5, and 6 here] 
 
The (positive) response of inflation to oil price shocks is smaller in inflation targeters after 
adopting inflation targeting and after achieving stationarity than before the adoption of inflation 
targeting (first and second rows of figure 4, respectively). These differences are not statistically 
different from zero, however, as reflected by the confidence intervals in column three. The opposite 
result is observed for nontargeters (third row, figure 4). The reaction of inflation to oil prices in 
nontargeters is larger after 1997 than before 1997, and this difference is statistically different from 
zero starting in the second quarter after the oil price shock. When we compare all inflation targeters 
with nontargeters after 1997 (fourth row, figure 4) and stationary inflation targeters with 
nontargeters after 1997 (fifth row, figure 4), we find that both inflation targeters and stationary 
inflation targeters react slightly more than nontargeters to oil price shocks on impact and in the first 
quarter after the shock, but less in the following quarters. While the differences are generally not 
statistically significant, the short-term response to an oil price shock in inflation-targeting countries 
is somewhat larger than in nontargeters, but it is smaller from the third quarter onward. 
To take into account the sample heterogeneity in our full treatment group of inflation targeters, 
we divide the group first into industrial and emerging-market inflation targeters and then further 
into inflation targeters before the start of inflation targeting and stationary-target inflation 
targeters. Figures 5 and 6 depict the response of inflation to a shock in oil prices, separately for 
industrial and emerging inflation targeters. The first row of each figure reports the comparison of 
inflation targeters before they adopted inflation targeting and after they achieved a stationary 
target; this is equivalent to the before-and-after comparison reported for all inflation targeters in the 
second row of figure 4. In rows 2 and 3 of each figure, we report comparisons across country groups 
(inflation targeters after they adopted inflation targeting and nontargeters in row 2 and inflation 
targeters after they achieved a stationary target and nontargeters in row 3); this is equivalent to the 
comparisons reported for all inflation targeters in rows 4 and 5 of figure 4, respectively. 
In both industrial and emerging economies, inflation responds less to oil price shocks under a 
stationary target than before the adoption of inflation targeting (first rows of figures 5 and 6), but 
the differences are not statistically significant. However, the inflation response to an oil price shock 
is larger in industrial inflation targeters with a stationary target than in emerging-market inflation 
targeters with a stationary target. While the inflation reaction is positive and significant during the 
seven quarters after the oil price shock in industrial stationary inflation targeters, it is significant 
only until the first quarter in emerging-market stationary inflation targeters. 
We now turn to the comparison of inflation targeters and nontargeters (the second and third 
rows of figures 5 and 6). In all inflation-targeting treatment groups, inflation responds less to oil 
price shocks than it does in nontargeters (after 1997), and this difference is significant by the sixth 
quarter, at the latest. In the case of emerging-market stationary inflation targeters, this difference is 
larger, earlier, and more significant than in the other inflation-targeting treatment groups: it is 
                                                       
18. The three shocks considered in this section—namely, shocks to the international price of oil, the domestic interest 
rate, and the international interest rate—are measured as one standard deviation of the residual of the corresponding 
equation.   12 
significant from the fourth to the sixth quarters (last row in figure 6). This last result shows that the 
performance in emerging stationary inflation targeters is the main force behind the results found for 
the full sample of inflation targeters (figure 4).  
This comparative evidence on the inflation consequence of oil price shocks leads us to two main 
conclusions. First, inflation targeting helps all inflation targeters to reduce the domestic inflation 
response to an oil price shock relative to their own pre-targeting experience, although this reduction 
is not statistically different from zero. Second, in all inflation-targeting treatment groups, the 
inflation response to oil price shocks is smaller than in nontargeting countries after 1997. The 
difference in favor of inflation targeters is statistically significant, on average, at later quarters, 
reflecting smaller and less persistent effects of an oil shock on domestic inflation in inflation-
targeting than in nontargeting countries. This result is particularly strong in emerging-market 
stationary inflation targeters, where the response of inflation to an oil price shock is the smallest and 
least persistent of all our subsamples. 
The response of inflation to innovations in the exchange rate provides a measure of the dynamics 
of devaluation-inflation pass-through. The positive response of inflation to exchange rate 
depreciation shocks is not much different before and after the adoption of inflation targeting in the 
full sample of inflation targeters (first row, figure 7). However, stationary-target inflation targeters 
show a larger decline in the response of inflation to exchange rate shocks, and this reduction is 
statistically significant in the first and second quarters after the shock. We observe a smaller 
response of inflation to exchange rate shocks in nontargeters after 1997 than in all inflation 
targeters and in stationary inflation targeters (fourth and fifth rows, figure 7). This result is 
statistically different from zero until the fourth quarter after the shock.  
 
[figures 7, 8, and 9 here] 
 
Next, we separate our treatment group into industrial and emerging inflation targeters (figures 8 
and 9). Industrial inflation targeters (after inflation targeting) and industrial stationary inflation 
targeters exhibit a significantly smaller inflation response to exchange rate shocks than either 
emerging-market inflation targeters (after inflation targeting) or emerging stationary inflation 
targeters. Both industrial treatment groups (that is, all inflation targeters and stationary inflation 
targeters) display pass-through coefficients that are close to zero and insignificant in most periods. 
Both emerging-market treatment groups, in turn, register pass-through coefficients that are positive 
and significant at least until the fourth quarter after the shock. In industrial inflation targeters, the 
adoption of both inflation targeting and stationary-target inflation targeting has not made any 
difference to their pass-through coefficients, in comparison with both their own pre-targeting 
experience and in comparison with nontargeters after 1997 (figure 8). In emerging-market 
economies, however, the comparisons yield very different results (figure 9). Short-term pass-through 
effects declined after the adoption of stationary targets in emerging economies, and the difference is 
significant in the first quarter after the exchange rate shock. Nevertheless, this reduction has not 
been sufficient to bring pass-through coefficients down to zero, as occurred among nontargeters after 
1997. In fact, emerging-market inflation targeters and stationary inflation targeters exhibit much 
larger pass-through effects than nontargeters, and the differences are significant from quarters one 
through four (for all inflation targeters) and quarters one through six (for stationary inflation 
targeters). 
We reach two conclusions from our comparison of the dynamics of pass-through effects from 
exchange rate shocks to domestic inflation. First, the adoption of inflation targeting has helped 
reduce the short-term pass-through somewhat under stationary-target inflation targeting, relative to 
the sample’s own pre-targeting experience. This result, however, is entirely driven by emerging-
market inflation targeters, where the pass-through coefficients fell somewhat after the countries 
achieved a stationary target but remain positive and significantly different from zero. Pass-through 
effects have been close to zero in industrial inflation targeters before and after inflation targeting 
and in nontargeters. Second, when comparing all inflation targeters and all stationary-target 
inflation targeters to nontargeters after 1997, the pass-through effects are significantly larger in   13 
both groups of targeters than in the nontargeters. This result is due to emerging-market inflation 
targeters, which exhibit much larger pass-through coefficients than nontargeters after 1997—and 
the differences are statistically significant from quarters one through five, on average. In contrast, 
industrial inflation targeters and nontargeters do not exhibit any significant differences in pass-
through performance. 
Finally, we consider the issue of comparative monetary independence, reflected by the response 
of domestic interest rates to shocks in international interest rates. In the pre-targeting period of 
inflation-targeting countries, the response of domestic interest rates to a shock in the international 
interest rate is very large, rises over time, and is statistically significant from impact through 
quarter six (first cell, figure 10). The positive response of the domestic interest rate to international 
interest rate shocks falls substantially in inflation targeters after they adopt inflation targeting and 
after they achieve stationary inflation targeting. In both cases, the decline in interest rate sensitivity 
is very large and statistically different from zero. Among nontargeters, interest rates react more 
strongly to international interest rates after 1997 than before, which may reflect the inclusion of a 
large number of euro area members in our control group. This difference is statistically significant 
only for the first two quarters after the shock. Interest rate sensitivity to foreign interest rate shocks 
is larger in inflation targeters and in stationary inflation targeters than in nontargeters after 1997; 
this difference is statistically different from zero in the case of all inflation targeters. This suggests 
that in the period of convergence, inflation targeting is not sufficient to achieve the level of monetary 
independence attained by nontargeters. However, interest rates in stationary inflation targeters 
respond to international interest rates at a similar magnitude as in nontargeters, since the 
difference in their impulse response functions is not statistically different from zero. Monetary 
independence under stationary inflation targeting has thus converged to the levels observed among 
nontargeters. 
 
[figures 10, 11, and 12 here] 
 
Our next task is to disaggregate industrial and emerging inflation targeters, since these two 
groups exhibit large and significant differences in monetary independence (see figures 11 and 12). 
The contrast in the domestic interest rate reaction to foreign interest rate shocks is striking in the 
pre-targeting period. While the response is negative and significant in the first quarters after the 
shock in the industrial pre-targeting experience, the response is positive, huge, increasing, and 
statistically significant in emerging-market countries. This points to a significant lack of monetary 
independence in the latter group before they adopted inflation targeting.  
The results are quite different after the adoption of inflation targeting. In industrial stationary 
inflation targeters, the domestic interest rate sensitivity turns positive and is significantly larger in 
the first four quarters after the shock than it was before inflation targeting. This makes industrial 
inflation targeters more similar to nontargeters: there is no statistical difference in monetary 
independence between industrial inflation targeters (and industrial stationary inflation targeters) 
and nontargeters after 1997. In emerging inflation targeters, however, the adoption of inflation 
targeting massively reduces their interest rate sensitivity to foreign interest rate shocks. The size of 
the interest rate response declines by one order of magnitude after the start of inflation targeting, 
but it remains positive and significant from quarters one through six. Emerging-market inflation 
targeters attain a further reduction in interest rate sensitivity on achieving a stationary target: the 
response is now barely positive and only significant in quarters two to four after the foreign interest 
rate shock. Comparing emerging inflation targeters with post-1997 nontargeters yields a larger 
interest rate sensitivity (that is, significantly different from zero in quarters three to six) in the 
former group. Once emerging-market economies reach their stationary targets, their interest 
sensitivity declines further to levels that are numerically smaller but statistically not different from 
those observed among nontargeters after 1997.  
We conclude two points from our comparisons of dynamic responses of domestic interest rates to 
a shock in the international interest rate, which serves as a measure of monetary independence. 
First, the adoption of inflation targeting brought down interest rate sensitivity estimates for the full   14 
sample of inflation-targeting countries. However, this aggregate result hides two opposite changes. 
In industrial countries, interest rate sensitivity increased from negative to positive and significant 
with the adoption of inflation targeting. In contrast, in emerging-market inflation targeters, interest 
rate sensitivity declined from huge before inflation targeting to moderate during converging-target 
inflation targeting and to small under stationary-target inflation targeting. Second, inflation 
targeters are more similar to nontargeters as a result of these changes. While the sensitivity of 
interest rates to foreign interest rate shocks is slightly larger in industrial stationary inflation 
targeters than in nontargeters, and slightly smaller in emerging-market stationary inflation 
targeters than in nontargeters, the differences are not statistically significant. Our measure of 
monetary independence thus reflects a convergence of inflation-targeting countries that have 
achieved stationary targets to the levels exhibited by nontargeters. 
 
 
4.  INFLATION  VOLATILITY,  OUTPUT  VOLATILITY, AND MONETARY  POLICY 
EFFICIENCY 
 
One way of gauging macroeconomic performance is to focus on the stability of inflation and real 
growth. The evidence reported in tables 2 and 3 shows that standard deviations of inflation and the 
output gap are larger in inflation targeters than in nontargeters. One possible explanation is that 
nontargeters are hit by smaller shocks. Alternatively, nontargeters’ central banks may be more 
efficient at implementing policies to meet their stabilization objectives. In this section, we compute 
performance measures to identify the contribution of different monetary policy strategies to the 
observed differences in macroeconomic performance between inflation targeters and nontargeters. 
Following Cecchetti and Krause (2002) and Cecchetti, Flores-Lagunes, and Krause (2006), we 
estimate an inflation and output variability efficiency frontier that allows us to derive measures of 
economic performance and monetary policy efficiency. 
The performance of monetary policy can be assessed using the inflation and output variability 
trade-off faced by the policymaker. This trade-off allows us to construct an efficiency frontier known 
as the Taylor curve (Taylor, 1979). The inflation-output variability frontier is understood by 
considering an economy that is hit by two types of disturbances: aggregate demand and aggregate 
supply shocks. Aggregate supply shocks move output and inflation in opposite directions, forcing the 
monetary authority to face a trade-off between inflation and output variability. The position of the 
efficiency frontier therefore depends on the intensity of aggregate supply shocks: the smaller the 
shocks, the closer is the frontier to the origin (see figure 13). 
 
[figure 13 here] 
 
The efficiency frontier is also an indicator of the degree of optimality of monetary policy. When 
monetary policy is suboptimal, the economy will exhibit large output and inflation volatility and will 
be located at a significant distance from the frontier. Movements toward the efficiency frontier 
indicate improved monetary policy (figure 13). These features of the efficiency frontier allow us to 
construct measures of economic and monetary policy performance to examine the contribution of 
policy efficiency and the variability of shocks to the observed differences in macroeconomic 
performance between different samples of nontargeters and inflation targeters. 
We closely follow the methodology derived by Cecchetti, Flores-Lagunes, and Krause (2006). We 
do not apply their method to individual countries, however, but rather to inflation-targeting and 
nontargeting country groups. We start by obtaining a measure of an economy’s performance in terms 
of output and inflation variability. Specifically, we derive a standard conventional central bank 
objective, which is to minimize the following loss function determined by quadratic inflation and 
output deviations: 
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where πt is the inflation rate, πt* is the inflation target or objective, yt is the log level of output, yt* is 
the target or trend level of output, and λ is the policymaker’s weight attached to inflation. Hence our 
measure of macroeconomic performance, L, is a weighted average of observed variability of inflation 
and output with respect to their target levels.  
The difference between the observed performance measures of nontargeters (LNIT) and inflation 
targeters (LIT) reflects differences in macroeconomic outcomes. If ΔL = LNIT – LIT is negative, then 
nontargeters present a better macroeconomic performance than inflation targeters. We similarly 
interpret the comparison of inflation targeters before and after they adopted inflation targeting. If 
ΔL = Lpost-IT – Lpre-IT is negative, then inflation targeters recorded a performance gain after the 
adoption of inflation targeting. 
This change in performance can reflect either a change in the position of the efficiency frontier 
(that is, a better performance is explained only by smaller supply shocks) or a change in monetary 
policy efficiency or both. The change in performance due to the change in the size of shocks is derived 
from the following combination of the optimal variances of output and inflation: 
 



























 are the deviations of inflation and output from their targets under 
an optimal policy, respectively. S is the measure of supply shocks variability. Therefore, the smaller 
the variability of the disturbances that hit the economy, the closer is the efficiency frontier to the 
origin and the smaller is the latter measure. For example, a negative difference of this measure 
between nontargeters and inflation targeters, ΔS = SNIT – SIT, indicates that the shocks hitting 
nontargeters are smaller. Alternatively, a negative value of ΔS = Spost-IT – Spre-IT implies that inflation 
targeters face smaller shocks after the adoption of inflation targeting.  
Finally, we evaluate the efficiency of monetary policy by measuring how close actual performance 
is to performance under optimal policy (that is, the distance to the efficiency frontier). We label this 
measure E and define it as follows: 
 































Hence, the smaller the value of E, the closer monetary performance is to optimal policy. Differences 
in policy efficiency between nontargeters and targeters are obtained by computing ΔE = ENIT – EIT; a 
negative value of ΔE implies that nontargeters’ policy is more efficient. Similarly, the change in 
policy efficiency of inflation targeters over time is computed as ΔE = Epost-IT – Epre-IT, which is 
negative if inflation targeters improved their policy efficiency.  
Computation of these performance measures requires empirical estimates of the output-inflation 
variability frontier. We first need to derive a policy reaction function from minimization of the loss 
function, subject to the constraints imposed by the structure of the economy. Given this solution and 
a value for the weight of inflation in the policymaker’s loss function (λ), we are able to plot a point on 
the efficiency frontier. Varying the weight assigned to the variability of inflation allows us to trace 
the entire efficiency frontier. We proceed in two main steps: we estimate a simple dynamic aggregate 
demand and supply model, and we then use this estimate to construct the efficiency frontier. 
We consider a simple dynamic panel aggregate demand and supply model similar to the one used 
in Rudebusch and Svensson (1999). The model consists of the following two equations: 
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The first equation reflects an aggregate demand function, where detrended output (yi,t) for country i 
at time t is explained by p own lags, p lags of the nominal interest rate (ii,t), and inflation deviations 
from targets or objectives (πi,t). We also include p lags of two exogenous variables, the deviation of the 
oil price from trend (oilt) and external price inflation (pxi,t), as well as a country fixed effect (v1,t).19 
The second equation represents a Phillips curve, in which inflation deviations from its target or 
objective are a function of p own lags, p lags of detrended output, p lags of the deviation of the oil 
price from trend, p lags of the deviation of external inflation from trend, and a country fixed effect. 
Finally, ε1,i,t and ε2,i,t represent the error terms. We estimate both equations for a group of countries 
(for example, nontargeters and targeters) using the generalized method of moments (GMM) for 
dynamic panels (Arellano and Bond, 1991). 
Having estimated the dynamics of the economy, we proceed to obtain the optimal monetary 
policy function. The central bank selects a path for the interest rate from the minimization of its loss 
function subject to the dynamics of the economy: 
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where Yt = (it–1, yt, yt–1, πt, πt–1)′, Xt = (pxt, oilt)′, vt = (0, ε1,t, 0, ε2,t, 0)′, B and D are matrices of the 
estimated coefficients of the aggregate demand and supply equations, Λ is a matrix of the weights 
attached to output and inflation variability, and Ê is the expectation conditional on information 
available at time t. The solution to this optimal control problem yields an optimal path for the 
interest rate: 
 
   
i
t = ΓY
t +Ψ,  (12) 
 
where Γ = –(c′Hc)–1c′HB with H = Λ + (B + cΓ)′H(B + cΓ), and ψ is a constant term that depends on 
B, c and D. Using this result, we calculate the optimal variances of output and inflation, obtaining a 
point on the efficiency frontier for each value of λ.  
With the estimated efficiency frontier at hand, we determine the optimal variances of inflation 
and output that are required to compute performance measures. We calculate the ratio of the 
observed volatilities of output and inflation and then identify the point on the frontier that implies 
this variability ratio. This is similar to performing a homothetic shift of the frontier so that it passes 
through the data point determined by the observed variances of output and inflation. 
Consistent with our measures in the other sections of the paper, here our measures of inflation 
volatility are based on the deviation of CPI inflation from the inflation target for inflation targeters 
and from a Hodrick-Prescott (HP) trend for nontargeters. For both county groups, output volatility is 
based on the output gap or deviation from an HP trend. 
                                                       
19. External inflation is defined as the sum of the annualized nominal exchange rate devaluation and the annual 
inflation rate of the United States.   17 
We are now able to compute the performance measures presented above in order to disentangle 
the contribution of changes in monetary policy efficiency and supply shocks to the observed 
differences in macroeconomic performance between different country groups. As in other sections of 
the paper, we compare the performance between five groups of countries: inflation targeters before 
and after the adoption of inflation targeting; inflation targeters before they adopted inflation 
targeting and after they achieved a stationary target; nontargeters before and after the mean 
inflation-targeting adoption date (first quarter of 1997); inflation targeters vis-à-vis nontargeters 
after the first quarter of 1997; and stationary inflation targeters versus nontargeters after the first 
quarter of 1997. As above, we also present results for all inflation targeters and for industrial and 
emerging inflation targeters. 
Table 9 reports the estimated comparative measures of economic performance, L, monetary 
policy efficiency, E, and the variability of supply shocks, S, for each pair of country groups. Figures 
14 through 26 depict actual performance points, L, and efficiency frontiers consistent with E for each 
pair of country groups. We follow Cecchetti, Flores-Lagunes, and Krause (2006) in using a value of 
λ—that is, the weight attached to inflation deviations in the loss function—equal to 0.80. This value 
is consistent with the empirical estimates for inflation-targeting and nontargeting countries reported 
by Cecchetti and Ehrmann (2002) and Corbo, Landerretche, and Schmidt-Hebbel (2002). 
 
[table 9 here] 
 
Row 1a of table 9 reports the estimated measures for all inflation targeters, before and after the 
adoption of inflation targeting. Figure 14 depicts the corresponding positions or observed 
combinations of output and inflation variability, as well as the efficiency frontiers observed before 
and after inflation-targeting adoption. Macroeconomic performance improved between these periods, 
as inflation and output volatility shrank. This is reflected by the inward shift of observed points or 
positions before and after inflation-targeting adoption in figure 14. The corresponding performance 
gain is reflected by a negative value of ΔL = L2 – L1, at –3.817, in row 1a. The latter improvement 
disaggregates into a gain in efficiency, ΔE  = E 2 – E1 (by –0.882, equivalent to a 23.1 percent 
contribution to the overall performance gain), which is reflected in a movement closer to the 
efficiency frontier, and a reduction in the variability of shocks hitting the economy, ΔS = S2 – S1 (by 
–2.935, equivalent to a 76.9 percent contribution), which is reflected in a shift of the efficiency 
frontier. Another way to confirm the contribution of shocks and policy efficiency to the initial and 
final positions, L1 and L2, is to quantitatively decompose the latter position, summarized in the 
second line of row 1a in table 9. Efficiency (E1) explains 35.3 percent of pre-targeting performance 
(L1), a share that rises to 45.7 percent after the adoption of inflation targeting. 
 
[figure 14 here] 
 
Rows 2a and 2b report the corresponding before-and-after comparisons for industrial and 
emerging inflation targeters. The variability of inflation and output is much larger in emerging than 
in industrial inflation targeters both before and after adoption of inflation targeting. For example, 
position L2 (after the adoption of inflation targeting) reflects a combination of inflation and output 
variability of 6.657 for emerging inflation targeters, versus 1.752 for industrial inflation targeters. 
Similar differences are observed in the efficiency frontier positions of industrial and emerging 
inflation targeters: the former are much closer to the origin than the latter (compare figures 15 and 
16). In both country groups, however, macroeconomic performance improved with the adoption of 
inflation targeting. Industrial inflation targeters observed a small improvement, with ΔL equaling –
0.199. This change results from two counteracting processes: a reduction in policy efficiency that 
deteriorated macroeconomic performance (lowering the observed gain by 194.3 percent) and a 
reduction in the variability of shocks that shifted the efficiency frontier significantly inward (which 
explains 294.3 percent of the performance gain). In contrast, emerging inflation targeters 
experienced a much larger macroeconomic improvement following the adoption of inflation targeting   18 
(ΔL is –5.206). This reflects both increased policy efficiency (contributing 42.5 percent) and a lower 
exposure to shocks (contributing 57.5 percent). 
 
[figures 15 and 16 here] 
 
The next comparison is between pre-targeting and stationary-targeting performance (rows 2a, 
2b, and 2c in table 9 and figures 17, 18, and 19). We find that inflation targeters reap a much larger 
improvement in macroeconomic performance once they achieve stationary inflation targets. The 
efficiency frontier position of stationary targeters has shifted much closer to the origin than was the 
case for all inflation targeters (both converging and stationary) discussed above (figure 17). 
Moreover, the relative contribution of efficiency improvements to the performance gain when 
adopting stationary inflation targeting is larger (34.2 percent) than the corresponding contribution of 
efficiency improvements when adopting inflation targeting in general (23.1 percent). As in the case of 
the full inflation-targeting sample, emerging stationary inflation targeters register a much larger 
gain than industrial stationary inflation targeters (rows 2b and 2c of table 9 and figures 18 and 19). 
The benefits reaped by emerging economies, however, are much larger for the sample of stationary 
targeters than for the full sample. 
 
[figures 17, 18, and 19 here] 
 
The third comparison is for nontargeters before and after the first quarter of 1997 (see row 3 in 
table 9 and figure 20). As in our previous comparisons, nontargeters record an improvement in 
macroeconomic performance in the later period. The reduction in their output and inflation 
volatility, however, is more than fully explained by a decrease in the size of shocks, while monetary 
policy efficiency deteriorated. This pattern parallels that seen for industrial targeters above. 
Therefore, both inflation-targeting and nontargeting industrial economies display a common feature: 
supply shocks weakened significantly after the adoption of inflation targeting or after 1997, which 
explains more than 100 percent of their observed macroeconomic performance gains. This stands in 
contrast to emerging inflation targeters, where both weaker supply shocks and improved policy 
efficiency contributed to their (much larger) performance gains. 
 
[figure 20 here] 
 
Next we compare inflation targeters after the adoption of inflation targeting and nontargeters 
after 1997. We use the performance changes over time observed for our treatment and control groups 
separately to compare macroeconomic performance across our treatment and control groups. We 
compare the performance of all inflation targeters (including both converging and stationary 
inflation targeters) and nontargeters (rows 4a, 4b, and 4c in table 9 and figures 21, 22, and 23) and of 
stationary inflation targeters and nontargeters (rows 5a, 5b, and 5c in table 9 and figures 24, 25, and 
26). A general result is that the full sample of inflation targeters (both converging and stationary 
targeters) exhibit actual performance levels, efficiency frontier positions, and policy efficiency levels 
that are worse than those of nontargeters. However, stationary inflation targeters are much closer to 
the performance and efficiency levels of nontargeters than is the full sample. The difference in 
performance between nontargeters and stationary targeters (–1.435; see row 5a) is primarily due to 
larger shocks in stationary inflation targeters (explaining 64.4 percent of the performance difference) 
and, to a lesser degree, to less efficient policy among inflation targeters (explaining 35.6 percent). 
 
[figures 21, 22, and 23 here] 
[figures 24, 25, and 26 here] 
 
When we disaggregate the inflation targeters into emerging and industrial countries, we find 
that the difference between nontargeters and inflation targeters is largely due to a significantly 
worse performance by emerging economies. Emerging inflation targeters (both converging and   19 
stationary) not only exhibit larger supply shocks, but are also further away from their efficiency 
frontiers (figure 23). However, the large difference between nontargeters and all emerging inflation 
targeters (ΔL equals –6.086; row 4c), declines by half once emerging inflation targeters attain 
stationary inflation targets (ΔL is –2.976; row 5c).  
Industrial inflation targeters are much closer in performance to our control group of 
nontargeters, and the difference narrows further when we compare stationary industrial inflation 
targeters to nontargeters (row 5b and figure 25). The relatively small difference in performance (ΔL 
is –0.787) is due mainly to the supply shocks faced by industrial stationary inflation targeters 
(explaining 67.5 percent of the difference) and less to less efficient policy (explaining 32.5 percent of 
the difference). 
Based on the evidence in this section, we conclude that countries adopting inflation targeting 
have substantially improved the efficiency of their monetary policy. Furthermore, the gains in 
efficiency are larger for stationary inflation targeters than for inflation targeters in general. 
Relevant differences in performance levels and gains are apparent when disaggregating inflation 
targeters into industrial and emerging economies. Observed macroeconomic performance is much 
better in industrial inflation targeters than in emerging inflation targeters both before and after the 
adoption of inflation targeting (or stationary inflation targeting). However, the improvement that 
comes with the adoption of inflation targeting is much larger in emerging economies than in 
industrial countries. Convergence toward stationary inflation targeting is particularly beneficial to 
emerging economies. These countries record major reductions in output and inflation volatility after 
adopting stationary inflation targeting, both because they face smaller supply shocks and because 
they improve their monetary policy efficiency. In contrast, industrial inflation targeters improve 
their macroeconomic performance only because they face smaller supply shocks; their monetary 
policy efficiency levels (which were already high before the adoption of inflation targeting, compared 
with emerging countries) actually deteriorate somewhat after the adoption of inflation targeting.  
The likely source of the overall macroeconomic improvement that comes with inflation targeting 
is the credibility that inflation targeters gain when they finally achieve sufficient disinflation to 
stabilize their inflation targets. Increased credibility helps shift monetary policy outcomes closer to 
the efficiency frontier. This is particularly the case of emerging countries, where the pre-targeting 
gap between actual and desirable macroeconomic performance is the largest and where pre-targeting 
credibility is weak. 
Although inflation targeting improves monetary performance over time, our control group of 
nontargeters still exhibits better macroeconomic performance and higher levels of monetary policy 
efficiency than our different treatment groups of inflation targeters. The differences between 
industrial nontargeters and emerging inflation targeters have narrowed massively under inflation 
targeting, but they remain large. Nontargeters also display better macroeconomic performance than 
industrial inflation targeters, but this difference is small and has narrowed under inflation 
targeting. Most of the remaining performance differences between industrial inflation targeters and 
nontargeters—in favor of the latter—stems from the smaller supply shocks faced by nontargeters, 






5. INFLATION ACCURACY 
 
How accurate are inflation-targeting central banks in hitting their official targets? And how does 
their accuracy compare to the success of nontargeting countries in achieving a stable inflation rate? 
The first question is addressed by Calderón and Schmidt-Hebbel (2003), Albagli and Schmidt-Hebbel 
(2005), and Roger and Stone (2005). The first two of these studies also identify the determinants of 
success in hitting inflation targets, showing that institutional variables (such as central bank   20 
independence) and credibility measures (including investment risk measures and country risk 
spreads) are significant factors in reducing target misses among inflation targeters. 
We address the second question in this section. Our results are tentative because they involve 
comparing easily measured deviations of actual inflation from target levels in inflation-targeting 
countries with the deviations of actual inflation from inflation objectives in nontargeting countries, 
which are not easily measured since they are not announced in nontargeting countries. We construct 
proxies for implicit inflation objectives in the form of inflation trends obtained using the Hodrick-
Prescott filter. These proxies are likely to underestimate the true measures of inflation deviations in 
nontargeting countries because the HP-filtered trend could react excessively to temporary inflation 
deviations. The size of the potential bias is likely to be inversely correlated with the degree of 
smoothing applied by the HP filter. We therefore conduct robustness tests of our results along two 
dimensions: the assumption about inflation deviations in inflation-targeting countries and the 
degree of HP smoothing of the actual inflation series. 
For the first dimension, we compute two measures of inflation deviations for inflation-targeting 
countries. The first inflation deviation measure (ID1) computes the deviation of actual inflation from 
actual inflation targets, while the second inflation deviation measure (ID2) provides the deviation of 
actual inflation from HP trends for inflation-targeting countries, to maximize comparability with our 
measure of inflation deviation for nontargeting countries. All measures are absolute values of 
inflation deviations. 
We report on both measures for several country groups and for the full 1989—2004 period and 
subperiods in table 10 and figure 27. For ID1, the median absolute inflation deviation is 1.03 percent 
for inflation targeters and 0.54 percent for nontargeters. For ID2, the median absolute inflation 
deviation is lower for inflation targeters, at 0.84 percent, and unchanged for nontargeters, at 0.54 
percent. The inflation deviation measure based on actual inflation targets (ID1) for inflation 
targeters is systematically larger than the one based on HP-filtered inflation trends (ID2) across all 
subgroups of inflation-targeting countries. This suggests that the use of HP-filtered inflation trends 
as a proxy for implicit inflation objectives for nontargeters and for inflation targeters during the pre-
targeting period may, in fact, bias downward the inflation deviation measures in inflation targeters 
and thus bias upward the reported differences of deviations between inflation targeters and 
nontargeters. 
 
[table 10 and figure 27 here] 
 
Figure 27 depicts the time pattern of median absolute inflation deviations for inflation targeters 
and nontargeters, using both measures. Nontargeters exhibit systematically lower inflation 
deviations than inflation targeters. However, inflation targeters’ median inflation deviations show a 
negative trend in 1989–2004, whereas the median inflation deviations of nontargeters are 
stationary.20  
Our subsamples of inflation targeters display large differences in hitting targets. According to 
the ID1 measure, the median absolute inflation deviation is 0.77 percent in industrial economies, 
versus 1.28 percent in emerging economies (table 10). The difference is even larger when we divide 
inflation targeting experiences according to periods of converging targets, when median absolute 
inflation deviations are 1.49 percent, and stationary targets, when deviations decline by half to reach 
0.77 percent. As expected, the largest difference is observed between two very heterogeneous 
nontargeting experiences: before the adoption of inflation targeting (or before 1997 for nontargeters), 
median absolute inflation deviations were 1.12 percent among inflation targeters and 0.36 percent 
among nontargeters.  
However, the latter prima facie evidence of poorer inflation accuracy in inflation-targeting 
countries is far from conclusive. Many large inflation-target misses could be explained by 
idiosyncratic country or time-period shocks, and these could be correlated with the adoption of 
inflation targeting, particularly in emerging economies. We thus test for significant differences in 
                                                       
20. We reject the presence of nonstationarity in all series at the 1 percent percent confidence level using the augmented 
Dickey-Fuller and Phillips-Perron unit root tests.   21 
inflation deviations between inflation targeters and nontargeters, controlling for potential 
determinants of inflation shocks. 
Following previous work on differences in inflation deviations among inflation targeters 
(Calderón and Schmidt-Hebbel, 2003; Albagli and Schmidt-Hebbel, 2005), we specify the following 
panel data specification for the absolute value of deviations of inflation (⎮πi,t – π*i,t⎮): 
 















i,t ,   (13) 
 
as a function of its own lag, a vector of relevant inflation-shock controls (Xit), a dummy variable (ITit) 
that takes a value of one if the country has an inflation-targeting regime in place and zero otherwise, 
and country- and time-specific effects. The inflation deviation is defined as the absolute value of the 
difference between the twelve-month CPI inflation rate (πi,t) and the annual inflation target (π*i,t). 
The vector of control variables comprises two domestic shocks (absolute nominal exchange rate 
shocks and the output gap or the absolute deviation of output growth from trend) and two external 
shocks (the lagged absolute deviation of the Federal funds rate from trend and the absolute deviation 
of the international oil price from trend).  
We estimate our model for absolute inflation deviations in equation 13 using an unbalanced 
panel sample of twenty-one inflation-targeting and twelve nontargeting countries, with quarterly 
observations for 1989–2004.21 As in preceding sections, we consider two alternative control groups: 
control group 1 includes the full nontargeting sample of both industrial nontargeting countries and 
the pre-targeting observations of all subsequent inflation targeters, while control group 2 
encompasses only the industrial nontargeting countries. Furthermore, we control for possible 
endogeneity of the choice of the inflation-targeting regime (the inflation-targeting dummy variable) 
and the two domestic shocks, using as instruments the variables listed at the bottom of tables 11 and 
12 and making use of panel data IV estimation. For control group 1, we obtain the fixed-effects 
estimator, but we are unable to estimate a fixed-effects model for control group 2 owing to the 
presence of time-invariant variables. To tackle this problem, we follow Plümper and Troeger (2004), 
who obtain a modified Hausman-Taylor IV estimator to compute the coefficients of time-invariant 
variables.22  
 
[tables 11 and 12 here] 
 
The results are reported in table 11 (using the ID1 measure as the dependent variable) and table 
12 (using the ID2 measure as the dependent variable). Each table presents results for the two 
alternative nontargeting control groups and for alternative inflation-targeting dummies (one for all 
inflation-targeting country experiences and others that capture a heterogeneous effect of inflation 
targeting for converging and stationary inflation-targeting periods and for emerging and industrial 
inflation-targeting countries).  
Inflation deviations exhibit systematic persistence, as reflected by the significant coefficient of 
the lagged dependent variable. Its point estimate is close to 0.5 across the ten results reported in 
tables 11 and 12, which shows that the long-term effects of all other variables are close to twice their 
contemporaneous effects. All control variables exhibit the expected positive signs, and most are 
significant at conventional levels.  
                                                       
21. To avoid endogeneity problems with the Federal funds rate variable, we excluded the United States from our 
standard control group of thirteen nontargeting countries. 
22. This procedure can be summarized in three steps. First, we estimate a panel fixed-effects model excluding time-
invariant right-hand-side variables. Second, we regress the fixed-effects vector on the time-invariant explanatory variables 
and obtain its unexplained part. Finally, we estimate a pooled IV model including all explanatory time-variant and time-
invariant variables, as well as the unexplained part of the fixed-effects vector. Using Monte Carlo experiments, Plümper and 
Troeger (2004) find that their estimation technique performs better than pooled OLS and random-effects models in the 
estimation of the coefficients of time-invariant variables.   22 
Our variable of interest—namely, the inflation-targeting dummy—exhibits a robust negative 
coefficient across all regressions, but it is only significant when we use the first control group. For 
example, the first column of table 11 reports that the contemporaneous effect of inflation targeting is 
to reduce absolute inflation deviations by 0.18 percent, when using the ID1 measure and the full 
sample of nontargeting country experiences (control group 1). Moreover, the contemporaneous 
impact of inflation targeting on absolute inflation deviations rises in magnitude from –0.18 to a long-
term effect of –0.40 percent, that is, 0.18 percent / (1–0.54). The effect of inflation targeting increases 
to –0.45 percent, but it is insignificant when we exclude pre-targeting experiences in inflation-
targeting countries (column 2). The latter result is the relevant one for comparing inflation-targeting 
experiences to those of countries that never had inflation targeting in place.  
The result in column 1, based on ID1, increases to –0.27 percent when we use the ID2 measure, 
as reported in column 1 of table 12. This confirms that inflation target deviations from actual targets 
lead to higher deviations than those measured as deviations from HP-filtered trends. It suggests that 
comparing actual deviations from observable targets in inflation-targeting countries with HP-filter-
inferred deviations from unobservable inflation objectives in nontargeting countries leads to an 
upward bias in inflation targeters’ deviations relative to nontargeters’ deviations. The reported 
coefficients for the inflation-targeting regime based on the ID1 measures are thus likely to be lower-
bound estimates, while those based on the ID2 measure might be closer to the unobservable regime 
difference. 
Columns 3, 4, and 5 in tables 11 and 12 report coefficients for separate inflation-targeting 
dummy variables for converging-target and stationary-target inflation-targeting periods and for 
emerging and industrial inflation targeters. For both cases, the coefficients exhibit the expected 
negative sign, but they vary in significance and magnitude. The results in column 3 show that 
converging inflation targeters exhibit about 0.24 percent lower absolute deviations of inflation, while 
the results for stationary inflation targeters vary from –0.13 percent to –0.26 percent. When we 
restrict the control group to the nontargeting countries that never had inflation targeting in place, 
the results remain negative but lose statistical significance (see column 4). Column 5 presents the 
coefficients that capture separate effects of inflation targeting on emerging and industrial economies. 
Only emerging countries show a significantly lower inflation deviation than that observed in control 
group 1. When we use the ID2 measure, however, the results suggest that both emerging and 
industrial inflation targeters observe lower absolute inflation deviations (of similar magnitude) than 
those observed in control group 1. 
To check the robustness of our results to the underlying assumptions on the Hodrick-Prescott 
filtering procedure to obtain inflation trends as proxies for inflation objectives, we ran the 
regressions reported in column 1 of tables 11 and 12 on alternative absolute inflation deviation 
series based on different values of the HP filter smoothing parameter used in obtaining trend 
inflation series.23  Figure 28 depicts the estimated coefficient of the inflation-targeting dummy 
variable for alternative smoothing parameter values ranging from 100 to 10,000. The figure suggests 
that the inflation-targeting coefficient estimates of –0.18 and –0.27 in column 1 of tables 11 and 12 
are robust to wide ranges of alternative HP smoothing parameters.  
 
[figure 28 here] 
 
We conclude the following from the results reported in this section. Prima facie, inflation 
deviations from inflation targets or trends are larger in inflation-targeting than in nontargeting 
countries. However, this evidence is based on simple sample statistics that do not control for country- 
and time-specific shocks that affect inflation deviations and that could be correlated with inflation-
targeting experiences (across countries and over time). When we control for the latter shocks, our 
econometric findings point toward a much more differentiated performance regarding inflation 
accuracy under inflation targeting. First, when comparing all inflation targeters (and also the 
emerging/industrial and converging/stationary subsamples) to all nontargeting experiences 
                                                       
23. The coefficient used in all HP-filtered trends discussed in this paper is the standard lambda equal to 1,600 for 
quarterly data.    23 
(including nontargeting countries and pre-targeting experiences, represented by control group 1), 
inflation deviations are smaller in inflation-targeting than in nontargeting countries. The point 
estimates for the inflation-targeting gain in inflation deviations ranges from 0.18 percent to 0.45 
percent (and roughly twice the latter range for the long-term inflation-targeting gain) for the full 
experience of inflation-targeting countries and periods. However, this result is not robust to using 
the alternative control group 2, comprising only nontargeting countries. While inflation deviations 
are still smaller in inflation-targeting countries, the corresponding coefficients are no longer 
significantly different from zero. When we use our preferred inflation deviation measure, ID2, and 
disaggregate all inflation targeters into different subgroups, we find that inflation targeting lowers 
absolute inflation deviations by similar amounts in emerging and industrial targeters and in 





A steadily growing number of industrial and emerging countries have explicitly adopted an 
inflation target as their nominal anchor. Eight industrial countries and thirteen emerging economies 
had full-fledged inflation targeting in place in early 2005. Many other emerging economies are 
planning to adopt inflation targeting in the near future. This paper has explored whether inflation 
targeting makes a difference after central banks adopt the regime as an explicit and exclusive anchor 
for conducting monetary policy. 
Previous empirical evidence on the direct link between inflation targeting and particular 
measures of economic performance provides some support for the view that inflation targeting is 
associated with an improvement in overall economic performance. However, the ongoing debate on 
whether inflation targeting matters indicates that open questions remain, particularly on the 
comparative macroeconomic performance in inflation targeting countries, both over time and relative 
to nontargeting countries. Are inflation levels and inflation and output volatilities lower in inflation-
targeting countries? Do monetary policy and macroeconomic performance variables respond 
differently to shocks under inflation targeting? Is monetary policy more efficient under inflation 
targeting? Are inflation-targeting central banks more accurate in hitting their targets than 
nontargeting countries are in maintaining or achieving stable inflation? 
We have addressed these questions by systematically applying a common methodological 
approach, across issues and throughout the paper. We have looked for empirical evidence in the 
world sample of twenty-one industrial and emerging-economy inflation-targeting countries, before 
and after their adoption of inflation targeting, and compared their performance to a control group of 
thirteen industrial nontargeters. We have distinguished between two types of inflation-targeting 
regimes, one in which inflation targets are still converging to the long-run goal for inflation and one 
in which the inflation target is stationary. We have tested for differences in group behavior of 
inflation targeters and nontargeters and for changes between pre- and post-targeting changes among 
inflation targeters, making statistical inferences from panel data estimations, panel vector 
autoregressive models, and panel impulse responses. Finally, to exploit the rich available data and 
identify dynamic patterns, we have used a high-frequency sample of quarterly data, covering 1989–
2004 and subperiods. 
Comparative descriptive statistics on inflation performance confirm that inflation targeters 
reduced their average inflation rates from 12.6 percent before the adoption of inflation targeting to 
4.4 percent thereafter. Inflation declined to 6.0 percent in the post-adoption convergence period and 
then to 2.3 percent after the achievement of stationary targets. Emerging-economy inflation 
targeters recorded an average 6.0 percent inflation after they adopted inflation targeting, while the 
corresponding figure is only 2.2 percent for industrial-economy inflation targeters. The latter figure 
is very close to the average 2.1 percent inflation recorded among nontargeters since 1997. A similar 
pattern is observed for inflation volatility. Inflation volatility in industrial inflation targeters is twice 
the level recorded in nontargeters, but inflation persistence is slightly lower in industrial inflation 
targeters than in nontargeters. Emerging inflation targeters, in turn, achieved a significant   24 
reduction in output growth volatility and output gap volatility under inflation targeting. 
Nontargeters also achieved a significant reduction in both volatility measures after 1997, to levels 
that are below those recorded by industrial inflation targeters. However, output persistence, like 
inflation persistence, is lower in stationary-target inflation targeters than in nontargeters. 
Moving beyond unconditional inflation comparison, we follow previous research by testing for 
systematic differences in inflation levels between inflation-targeting and nontargeting countries, 
controlling for past inflation. The evidence on the comparative inflation performance of inflation 
targeters and nontargeters reported both here and in the previous literature shows that the effect of 
inflation targeting on inflation can go either way. Our findings suggest that the source of such 
differences lies in the use of heterogeneous control groups. The absence of panel data techniques in 
the earlier literature prevents the disaggregation of control groups across countries and time.  
We have extended the earlier research, exploiting both the cross-section and time dimensions of 
our sample. We find that the largest difference in inflation performance is observed when the 
treatment group is compared to its own pre-targeting experience. When nontargeting countries are 
added to the control group, this effect declines but is still statistically significant. However, when we 
restrict the control group to nontargeting countries, we find no systematic, significant difference in 
inflation between inflation targeters and nontargeters. Further disaggregation of the treatment 
group into industrial and emerging inflation targeters and into converging-target and stationary-
target inflation targeters yields mixed results. They confirm that results are highly dependent on the 
choice of control groups. They also suggest that emerging-economy and converging-target inflation 
targeters record the largest gains in inflation reduction. Industrial inflation targeters exhibit a 
statistically weak reduction in inflation in comparison with industrial nontargeting countries. 
If inflation targeting improves the credibility of monetary policy and strengthens the anchoring 
of inflation expectations, we would expect inflation targeting to reduce inflation’s response to oil 
price shocks and lessen the pass-through effect from exchange rate shocks. As a result of increased 
credibility and reduced devaluation to inflation pass-through, inflation targeting may also 
strengthen monetary policy independence (that is, weaken the reaction of domestic interest rates to 
foreign interest rate shocks). We have therefore assessed whether inflation targeters differ from 
nontargeters—and whether post-targeting differs from pre-targeting among inflation targeters—in 
the response of inflation to shocks in oil prices and the exchange rate and the response of domestic 
interest rates to innovations in international interest rates. Our results are as follows. 
We reach two conclusions on the inflation consequence of oil price shocks. First, inflation 
targeting helps all inflation targeters reduce the domestic inflation response to an oil price shock 
relative to their own pre-targeting experience, although this reduction is not statistically different 
from zero. Second, in all inflation-targeting treatment groups, the inflation response to oil price 
shocks is smaller than in nontargeting countries after 1997. The difference in favor of inflation 
targeters is statistically significant, on average, for later quarters, because the effects of an oil shock 
on domestic inflation are smaller and less persistent in inflation-targeting countries than in 
nontargeters. Surprisingly, this result is particularly strong in emerging-market stationary-target 
inflation targeters, where the response of inflation to the oil price is the smallest and least 
persistent. 
We also present two conclusions based on our comparison of the dynamics of the pass-through 
effects from exchange rate shocks to domestic inflation. First, the adoption of inflation targeting 
helped reduce the short-term pass-through under stationary-target inflation targeting, vis-à-vis their 
own pre-targeting experience. This result, however, is entirely driven by emerging-market inflation 
targeters, where pass-through coefficients fell somewhat after a stationary target was achieved but 
remained positive and significantly different from zero. In industrial inflation targeters and 
nontargeters, the pass-through effects were close to zero before and after inflation targeting (or 
before and after 1997, in the case of nontargeters). Second, when we compare all inflation targeters 
and all stationary inflation targeters to nontargeters after 1997, the pass-through coefficients are 
significantly larger in the former groups than in the latter. This result is due to emerging-market 
inflation targeters, which exhibit much larger pass-through coefficients than nontargeters after 
1997; the differences are statistically significant from quarters 1 through 5, on average. In contrast,   25 
industrial inflation targeters and nontargeters do not exhibit any significant differences in pass-
through performance. 
To measure monetary independence, we compared the dynamic responses of domestic interest 
rates to a shock in the international interest rate, and we again arrived at two conclusions. First, the 
adoption of inflation targeting has brought down interest sensitivity estimates for the full group of 
inflation-targeting countries. This aggregate result hides two opposing changes, however. The 
adoption of inflation targeting in industrial countries has increased interest rate sensitivity from 
negative to positive and significant. In contrast, in emerging-market inflation targeters, interest 
sensitivity has declined from huge before inflation targeting to moderate during converging-target 
inflation targeting and to small under stationary-target inflation targeting. Second, these changes 
made inflation targeters more similar to nontargeters. While interest rate sensitivity to foreign rate 
shocks is slightly larger in industrial stationary inflation targeters than in nontargeters and slightly 
smaller in emerging-market stationary inflation targeters than in nontargeters, the differences are 
not statistically significant. Our measures of monetary independence thus reveal a convergence of 
inflation-targeting countries that have achieved stationary targets to the levels exhibited by 
nontargeters. 
Next we investigated the potential gains associated with inflation targeting in terms of 
improving macroeconomic performance (that is, the reduction in inflation and output volatilities), 
which can be attributed to smaller supply shocks and more efficient monetary policy. The 
comparative results for inflation-targeting countries over time (that is, before and after the adoption 
of inflation targeting) and relative to nontargeting countries are as follows. Adopting inflation 
targeting led to substantial improvement in the efficiency of monetary policy; these gains are larger 
for stationary inflation targeters than for inflation targeters in general. Observed macroeconomic 
performance is much better in industrial inflation targeters than in emerging inflation targeters, 
both before and after the adoption of inflation targeting (or stationary inflation targeting). However, 
emerging economies recorded a much greater improvement following the adoption of inflation 
targeting than industrial countries. Emerging economies registered major reductions in output and 
inflation volatility after adopting stationary inflation targeting, both because they faced smaller 
supply shocks and because they improved their monetary policy efficiency. In contrast to emerging 
inflation targeters, industrial targeters improved their macroeconomic performance only because 
they faced smaller supply shocks; their monetary policy efficiency levels (which were already high 
before the adoption of inflation targeting, compared with emerging countries) actually deteriorated 
somewhat after the adoption of inflation targeting.  
Although inflation targeting improves monetary performance over time, our control group of 
nontargeters still exhibits better macroeconomic performance and higher levels of monetary policy 
efficiency than our different treatment groups of inflation targeters. The differences between 
industrial nontargeters and emerging inflation targeters narrowed massively under inflation 
targeting, but they still remain large after the achievement of stationary inflation targeting. 
Nontargeters also exhibited better macroeconomic performance than industrial inflation targeters, 
but this difference was small and narrowed under inflation targeting. Most of the remaining 
performance difference between industrial inflation targeters and nontargeters—in favor of the 
latter—is explained by the smaller supply shocks faced by nontargeters, while monetary policy 
efficiency is only marginally better in nontargeters than in industrial inflation targeters. 
We ended our research by comparing the success of inflation-targeting central banks in hitting 
their official targets (or maintaining inflation levels close to their inflation trends) to the success of 
nontargeting central banks in maintaining inflation levels close to their inflation trends. Prima facie, 
inflation deviations from inflation targets or trends are larger in inflation-targeting than in 
nontargeting countries. However, thi s  e v i d e n c e  i s  b a s e d  o n  s i m p l e  s a m p l e  s t a t i s t i c s  t h a t  d o  n o t  
control for country- and time-specific shocks that affect inflation deviations and that could be 
correlated with inflation-targeting experiences (across countries and over time). When we control for 
such shocks, our findings point to a more differentiated performance regarding inflation accuracy 
under inflation targeting. First, when comparing the full sample of inflation targeters (and also the 
emerging/industrial and converging/stationary subsamples) to all nontargeting experiences   26 
(including nontargeting countries and pre-targeting experiences), inflation deviations are 
significantly smaller in inflation-targeting than in nontargeting experiences. This result is not 
robust, however, when the control group includes only nontargeting countries. Inflation deviations 
are still numerically smaller in inflation-targeting countries relative to nontargeting countries, but 
the differences are not statistically significant from zero. This holds for both the aggregate treatment 
group comprising all inflation targeters and the different inflation-targeting subgroups (emerging 
and industrial targeters and converging and stationary targeters): inflation deviations are 
numerically lower than in nontargeting countries, but the difference is not statistically significant.  
We conclude that our evidence supports inflation targeting. Inflation targeting seems to help 
countries achieve lower inflation in the long run, reduce their response to oil price and exchange rate 
shocks, strengthen monetary policy independence, improve monetary policy efficiency, and obtain 
inflation outcomes that are closer to target levels. Furthermore, some benefits of inflation targeting 
increase when inflation targeters achieve disinflation and are able to implement a stationary 
inflation target. This may suggest that the credibility of an inflation-targeting regime improves once 
it becomes a stationary regime. 
Inflation targeting thus seems to be the natural monetary regime choice, especially for emerging-
market economies, where the gains from inflation targeting are found to be the largest. Not 
surprisingly, a large number of developing countries are currently planning to adopt inflation 
targeting in the near future. 
Despite the favorable results attained by inflation-targeting countries over time, our evidence 
generally does not suggest that countries that adopt inflation targeting have improved their 
monetary policy performance beyond that of our control group of nontargeters, all of which are 
industrial countries with a successful monetary policy. However, inflation targeting does seem to 
help countries converge toward the performance of our very demanding control group, particularly 
during the mature phase of stationary targeting.  
Indeed, obtaining a strong nominal anchor is the key to successful monetary policy. Our evidence 
suggests that some industrial countries have been able to obtain a strong nominal anchor without 
resorting to inflation targeting. The Federal Reserve’s policies under Alan Greenspan, for example, 
may not have been very different or any better if the Federal Reserve had adopted inflation targeting 
(Mishkin, 2005). It is therefore not entirely surprising that we did not find much evidence that 
inflation targeters do better than our control group of industrialized nontargeters. 
Nevertheless, the adoption of inflation targeting can have advantages even for industrial 
countries. Industrialized countries that have not adopted inflation targeting face four problems (see 
Bernanke and others, 1999; Mishkin, 2005). First, the strong nominal anchor that produced a 
successful monetary policy is often based on individuals, and their replacements may not be strongly 
committed to the nominal anchor. Second, the focus on the long run exhibited by successful 
nontargeters may weaken in the future. Third, the lack of transparency about the goals of monetary 
policy increases uncertainty. Fourth, the lack of accountability in the absence of inflation targeting 
could undermine central bank independence in the future, thereby weakening the nominal anchor. 
Inflation targeting has the potential to ensure that the successful monetary policy performance of 
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Australia  1989:1–1994:2    1994:3–2004:4  2–3 
Canada  1989:1–1990:4  1991:1–
1994:4 
1995:1–2004:4  1–3 
Iceland  1989:1–2000:4  2001:1–
2002:4 
2003:1–2004:4  2.5 
New Zealand  1989:1–1989:4  1990:1–
1992:4 
1993:1–2004:4  1–3 
Norway  1989:1–2000:4    2001:1–2004:4  2.5 
Sweden   1989:1–1994:4    1995:1–2004:4  2 (+/–1) 
Switzerland  1989:1–1999:4    2000:1–2004:4  <2 
United Kingdom  1989:1–1991:4    1992:1–2004:4  2 
Group average        2.2 
         
Emerging 
Economies 
       
Brazil  1989:1–1998:4  1999:1–
2004:4 
  4.5 (+/–2.5) 
Chile  1989:1–1990:4  1991:1–
2000:4 
2001:1–2004:4  2–4 
Colombia  1989:1–1998:4  1999:1–
2004:4 
  5 (+/–0.5) 
Czech Republic  1989:1–1997:4  1998:1–
2004:4 
  3 (+/–1) 
Hungary   1989:1–2000:4  2001:1–
2004:4 
  3.5 (+/–1) 
Israel   1989:1–1991:4  1992:1–
2002:4 
2003:1–2004:4  1–3 
Korea   1989:1–1997:4  1998:1–
1998:4 
1999:1–2004:4  2.5–3.5 
Mexico  1989:1–1998:4  1999:1–
2002:4 
2003:1–2004:4  3 (+/–1) 
Peru  1989:1–1993:4  1994:1–
2001:4 
2002:1–2004:4  2.5 (+/–1) 
Philippines  1989:1–2000:4  2001:1–
2004:4 
  5–6 
Poland  1989:1–1997:4  1998:1–
2003:4 
2004:1–2004:4  2.5 (+/–1) 
South Africa  1989:1–1999:4    2001:1–2004:4  3–6 
Thailand  1989:1–1999:4    2000:1–2004:4  0–3.5 
Group average, eight stationary-target countries    3.0 
Group average, five converging-target countries    3.6 
 
 
 Source: Authors’ calculations, based on data from central bank websites.    30 
 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics on Inflation Levels, Volatility, and Persistence of 
Inflation Targeters and Nontargeters, 1989–2004a 




Nontargeting countries     
Mean   4.01  2.07 
Standard deviation  1.37  0.79 
Persistence 0.91  0.83 
All inflation-targeting countries     
Mean   12.63  4.37 
Standard deviation  3.91  2.63 
Persistence 0.83  0.81 
Industrial inflation-targeting countries     
Mean   4.73  2.24 
Standard deviation  2.16  1.40 
Persistence 0.79  0.76 
Emerging inflation-targeting countries     
Mean   18.56  5.97 
Standard deviation  5.23  3.55 




Mean   —  6.04 
Standard deviation  —  3.11 




Mean   —  2.32 
Standard deviation  —  1.29 
Persistence —  0.71 
Source: Authors’ calculations, based on data from International Monetary Fund, International 
Financial Statistics.  
a. Persistence is measured as the estimated coefficient of an AR(1) equation for inflation. 
b. For nontargeters, the corresponding period is 1989–96. 
c. For nontargeters, the corresponding period is 1997–2004. 
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Table 3. Descriptive Statistics on GDP Growth and Output Gap Volatility and 
Persistence of Targeters and Nontargeters, 1989–2004a 




Nontargeting countries     
Standard deviation of GDP growth  4.01  2.07 
Standard deviation of output gap  1.37  0.79 
Persistence of GDP growth  0.73  0.74 
Persistence of output gap  0.71  0.68 
All inflation-targeting countries     
Standard deviation of GDP growth  3.04  2.23 
Standard deviation of output gap  1.87  1.36 
Persistence of GDP growth  0.75  0.74 
Persistence of output gap  0.65  0.75 
Industrial inflation-targeting countries     
Standard deviation of GDP growth  2.01  2.15 
Standard deviation of output gap  1.36  1.29 
Persistence of GDP growth  0.75  0.74 
Persistence of output gap  0.69  0.72 
Emerging inflation-targeting countries     
Standard deviation of GDP growth  3.81  2.30 
Standard deviation of output gap  2.26  1.41 
Persistence of GDP growth  0.75  0.76 




Standard deviation of GDP growth  —  2.43 
Standard deviation of output gap  —  1.50 
Persistence of GDP growth  —  0.68 




Standard deviation of GDP growth  —  1.52 
Standard deviation of output gap  —  1.15 
Persistence of GDP growth  —  0.55 
Persistence of output gap  —  0.61 
Source: Authors’ calculations, based on data from International Monetary Fund, International 
Financial Statistics.  
a. Persistence is measured as the estimated coefficient of an AR(1) equation for inflation. 
b. For nontargeters, the corresponding period is 1989–96. 
c. For nontargeters, the corresponding period is 1997–2004. 
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Table 4. Difference in Inflation between Inflation Targeters and Nontargeters in 
Previous Literature 
 
















Ball and Sheridan 
(2005) 
Targeters: 7 industrial 
economies; nontargeters: 
13 industrial economies 
Cross-
section, OLS 
Zero  Zero  Zero 
IMF (2005)  Targeters: 13 emerging 
economies; nontargeters: 
22 emerging economies 
Cross-
section, OLS 




Targeters: 23 industrial and 
emerging economies; 
nontargeters: 86 industrial 






2.6–4.8%  1.5–2.0%  Ambiguo
us 
 




Table 5. Inflation Difference between Targeters and Nontargeters: Cross-Section OLS 
Estimationa 
Explanatory variable  Coefficient 
Inflation-targeting dummy  1.007 
  (0.093)* 
Pre-targeting (pre-1997) inflation  –0.850 
  (0.000)*** 
Constant  1.468 
  (0.002)** 
   
R2  0.973 
No. observations  34 
No. countries  34 
Source: Author’s estimations. 
* Statistically significant at the 10 percent level. 
** Statistically significant at the 5 percent level. 
*** Statistically significant at the 1 percent level. 
a. P values are reported in parentheses. 
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Table 6. Difference in Inflation between Inflation Targeters and Nontargeters: Panel 
Samplea 
  Control group 1  Control group 2  Control group 3 















–0.010  –0.010  –0.338  –0.491 
  (0.047)**  (0.000
)*** 















Constant  0.596  0.660  0.568  0.160  0.590  1.023 
  (0.004)*  (0.002
)*** 
(0.009)***  (0.465)  (0.082)*  (0.003) 
             
No. observations  1942  1942  1420  1420  1183  1183 
No. countries  34  34  34  34  21  21 
Source: Author’s estimations. 
* Statistically significant at the 10 percent level. 
** Statistically significant at the 5 percent level. 
*** Statistically significant at the 1 percent level. 
a. Control group 1 includes all nontargeters and pre-targeters; control group 2 includes all 
nontargeters; control group 3 includes pre-targeters. Control group 2 regressions cannot be 
estimated using panel data techniques since country fixed effects are perfectly collinear with 
inflation targeting. Instruments used in control group 1 and 3 are the lagged inflation-targeting 
dummy and initial inflation; the instrument used in control group 2 is initial inflation. Time 
dummies are included for every quarter, and p values are reported in parentheses. 
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Table 7. Difference in Inflation between Inflation Targeters and Nontargeters, 
Disaggregated by Industrial and Emerging  Targetersa 
  Control group 1  Control group 2  Control group 3  



















Explanatory variable  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Inflation-targeting 
dummy 
–0.071  –0.806  –0.061  0.103  –0.142  –0.745 




(0.118)  (0.490)  (0.002)
*** 






















Summary statistic             
No. observations  1590  1613  1080  1099  831  854 
No. countries  34  33  22  25  21  20 
Source: Author’s estimations. 
* Statistically significant at the 10 percent level. 
** Statistically significant at the 5 percent level. 
*** Statistically significant at the 1 percent level. 
a. Control group 1 includes all nontargeters and pre-targeters; control group 2 includes all 
nontargeters; control group 3 includes pre-targeters. Control group 2 regressions cannot be 
estimated using panel data techniques since country fixed effects are perfectly collinear with 
inflation targeting. Instruments used in control group 1 and 3 are the lagged inflation-targeting 
dummy and initial inflation; the instrument used in control group 2 is initial inflation. Time 
dummies are included for every quarter, and p values are reported in parentheses. 
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Table 8. Difference in Inflation between Inflation Targeters and Nontargeters, 
Disaggregated by Stationary and Converging Targetersa 
  Control group 1  Control group 2  Control group 3  















Explanatory variable  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Inflation-targeting 
dummy 
–0.197  –0.858  0.020  0.021  –0.148  –0.929 
  (0.093)*  (0.000)**
* 
(0.607)  (0.750)  (0.462)  (0.001)**
* 













Constant  –0.085  0.864  –0.097  0.557  0.055  1.122 
  (0.698)  (0.002)**
* 
(0.560)  (0.011)**  (0.901)  (0.138) 
             
No. observations  1636  1567  1118  1050  877  808 
No. countries  34  34  24  27  21  21 
Source: Author’s estimations. 
* Statistically significant at the 10 percent level. 
** Statistically significant at the 5 percent level. 
*** Statistically significant at the 1 percent level. 
a. Control group 1 includes all nontargeters and pre-targeters; control group 2 includes all 
nontargeters; control group 3 includes pre-targeters. Control group 2 regressions cannot be 
estimated using panel data techniques since country fixed effects are perfectly collinear with 
inflation targeting. Instruments used in control group 1 and 3 are the lagged inflation-targeting 
dummy and initial inflation; the instrument used in control group 2 is initial inflation. Time 
dummies are included for every quarter, and p values are reported in parentheses. 
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Table 9. Changes in Performance and Policy Efficiency over Time and between Targeters 
and Nontargeters 
  Sample Group 1  Sample Group 2  Change 










8.302 2.931 5.371 Targeters  after 
targeting 
4.485 2.048  2.436  –3.817  –
0.882 
–2.935 






1.952 0.398 1.553 Industrial 
targeters after 
targeting 
1.752 0.786  0.966  –0.199  0.
388 
–0.587 






11.863 5.308  6.555  Emerging 
targeters after 
targeting 
6.657 3.098  3.559  –5.206  –
2.211 
–2.995 





8.302 2.931 5.371 Stationary 
targeters 
2.007 0.780  1.227  –6.296  –
2.151 
–4.145 






1.952 0.398 1.553 Industrial 
stationary 
targeters 
1.358 0.524  0.834  –0.593  0.
126 
–0.719 




11.863 5.308  6.555  Emerging 
stationary 
targeters 
3.547 1.850  1.697  –8.316  –
3.459 
–4.857 
(as % of L)    44.7  55.3  (as % of L)   52.1  47.9    41.6  58.4 
3. Nontargeters 
before 1997 
0.869 0.129 0.740 Nontargeters 
after 1997 
0.571 0.268  0.303  –0.298 0.139  –0.437 
(as % of L)    14.9  85.1  (as % of L)    47.0  53.0    –46.9  146.9 
4a. Targeters after 
targeting 
4.485 2.048 2.436 Nontargeters 
after 1997 
0.571 0.268  0.303  –3.913  –
1.780 
–2.134 




1.752 0.786 0.966 Nontargeters 
after 1997 
0.571 0.268  0.303  –1.181  –
0.517 
–0.663 




6.657 3.098 3.559 Nontargeters 
after 1997 
0.571 0.268  0.303  –6.086  –
2.829 
–3.257 
(as % of L)    46.5  53.5  (as % of L)   47.0  53.0    46.5  53.5 
5a. Stationary 
targeters 
2.007 0.780 1.227 Nontargeters 
after 1997 
0.571 0.268  0.303  –1.435  –
0.511 
–0.924 




1.358 0.524 0.834 Nontargeters 
after 1997 
0.571 0.268  0.303  –0.787 –0.3 –0.5 




3.547 1.850 1.697 Nontargeters 
after 1997 
0.571 0.268  0.303  –2.976  –
1.581 
–1.395 
(as % of L)    52.1  47.9  (as % of L)   47.0  53.0    53.1  46.9 
 
Source: Author’s estimations.   37 
Table 10. Absolute Deviation of the Inflation Rate from Target or Trend in Inflation 
Targeters and Nontargetersa 
 ID1  ID2 
 Percentile  Percentile 







9  0.33 0.84 1.74 






9 0.23  0.50  1.13 



























0 0.24  0.54  1.20 






7 0.18  0.36  0.67 







8  0.41 1.12 2.38 
Source: Author's calculations, based on data from Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development, Main Economic Indicators; IMF; and central banks. 
a.  For inflation-targeting countries, ID1 is defined as the absolute deviation of actual inflation 
from inflation targets, and ID2 is the absolute deviation of actual inflation from its HP trend. For 
nontargeting countries, ID1 and ID2 are defined as the absolute deviation of actual inflation from its 
HP trend. Number of countries is in parentheses.   38 












Explanatory  variable  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Abs [Deviation from target (t–1)] 0.537  0.490  0.537  0.511  0.537 
        (0.000)***      (0.000)***       0.000)***      (0.000)***      (0.000)*** 
Inflation-targeting dummy  –0.181  –0.447        
 (0.063)*  (0.275)         
Abs [NER depreciation]  0.047  0.013  0.048  0.021  0.047 
 (0.000)***  (0.039)**      (0.000)***      (0.007)***      (0.000)*** 
Abs [Output gap (t–1)] 0.033  0.035  0.038  0.075  0.029 
  (0.443) (0.393) (0.394) (0.245) (0.503) 
Abs [Oil gap]  0.003  0.002  0.003  0.002  0.003 
  (0.069)* (0.123) (0.075)* (0.192) (0.062)* 
Abs [Fed funds rate (t–4)] 0.033  0.020  0.035  0.030  0.034 
  (0.014)**  (0.197)      (0.009)*** (0.063)* (0.011)** 
Stationary targeters       –0.133  –0.348    
       (0.257)  (0.489)    
Converging targeters       –0.232  –0.118    
       (0.065)*  (0.924)    
Emerging  targeters         –0.245 
         (0.039)** 
Industrial  targeters         –0.077 
         (0.610) 
Constant –0.105  1.063  –0.123  0.629  –0.111 
 (0.358)  (0.012)**  (0.288)  (0.496)  (0.333) 
No.  observations  1861 1375 1865 1391 1861 
No.  countries  33 33 33 33 33 
Source: Author’s estimations. 
* Statistically significant at the 10 percent level. 
** Statistically significant at the 5 percent level. 
*** Statistically significant at the 1 percent level. 
a. The dependent variable is absolute inflation deviation, given by our ID1 measure. For inflation-targeting 
countries, ID1 is defined as the absolute deviation of actual inflation from inflation targets; for nontargeting 
countries, ID1 is defined as the absolute deviation of actual inflation from its HP trend. The regressions are based 
on panel IV estimations. The instrument set includes lagged values of inflation deviation from target, an inflation-
targeting dummy, nominal exchange rate depreciation, the output gap, and contemporaneous observations of the oil 
gap and the Federal funds rate. Control group 1 includes all nontargeters and pre-targeters; control group 2 includes 
only all nontargeters. P values are reported in parentheses.    39 
 












Explanatory variable  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Abs [Deviation from target (t–1)] 0.527 0.502 0.528 0.451 0.527 
 (0.000)***  (0.000)***  (0.000)***  (0.000)***       (0.000)*** 
Inflation-targeting dummy  –0.270  –0.205        
 (0.002)***  (0.668)         
Abs [NER depreciation]  0.038  0.005  0.038  0.007  0.038 
  (0.000)***    (0.309)     (0.000)***     (0.212)       (0.000)*** 
Abs [Output gap (t–1)] 0.091  0.121  0.091  0.134  0.091 
     (0.021)**  (0.002)***     (0.026)**     (0.005)*** (0.023)** 
Abs [Oil gap]  0.003  0.002  0.003  0.002  0.003 
     (0.033)**     (0.078)*     (0.033)**     (0.133)  (0.032)** 
Abs [Fed funds rate (t–4)] 0.026  0.005  0.026  0.010  0.026 
     (0.034)**     (0.716)     (0.031)**    (0.033)** 
Stationary targeters       –0.264  –0.408    
          (0.012)**  (0.408)    
Converging targeters       –0.258  –0.121    
          (0.023)**  (0.907)    
Emerging targeters           –0.280 
                (0.008)*** 
Industrial targeters           –0.252 
           (0.061)* 
Constant  –0.051 0.684 –0.060 0.730  –0.052 
 (0.615)  (0.177)  (0.562)  (0.390)  (0.608) 
No. observations  1861  1390  1865  1391  1861 
No. country  33  33  33  33  33 
Source: Author’s estimations. 
* Statistically significant at the 10 percent level. 
** Statistically significant at the 5 percent level. 
*** Statistically significant at the 1 percent level. 
a. The dependent variable is absolute inflation deviation, given by our ID2 measure. For both inflation-targeting 
and nontargeting countries, ID2 is defined as the absolute deviation of actual inflation from its HP trend. The 
regressions are based on panel IV estimations. The instrument set includes lagged values of inflation deviation from 
target, an inflation-targeting dummy, nominal exchange rate depreciation, the output gap, and contemporaneous 
observations of the oil gap and the Federal funds rate. Control group 1 includes all nontargeters and pre-targeters; 
control group 2 includes only all nontargeters. P values are reported in parentheses.    40 
























































Source: authors’ calculations, based on data from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics 
and central bank websites. 
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Source: authors’ calculations, based on data from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics 
(IFS). 
a. Annual averages of inflation for twenty-one inflation-targeting countries and thirteen 
nontargeting countries, identified in the text. Inflation are averages of four-quarterly twelve-month 
CPI inflation rates for the corresponding year. 
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Source: authors’ calculations based on data from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics (IFS). 
a. Annual averages of inflation rates for nine industrial and twelve emerging inflation-targeting countries, identified in the text. Inflation rates are averages of 
four-quarterly twelve-month CPI inflation rates for the corresponding year. 
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Figure 4. Response of Inflation to an Oil Price Shock: All Inflation Targeters  
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Source: Author’s estimations. 
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Figure 7. Response of Inflation to an Exchange Rate Shock: All Inflation Targeters 
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Source: Author’s estimations. 
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Figure 10. Response of the Domestic Interest Rate to an International Interest Rate 
Shock: All Inflation Targeters  
 


















































































































































































0123456  50 
Figure 11. Response of the Domestic Interest Rate to to an International Interest Rate 






















































































































































Figure 12. Response of the Domestic Interest Rate to to an International Interest Rate 









































































































































































Figure 14. Estimated Efficiency Frontiers and Observed Performance Points: All 























































Figure 15. Estimated Efficiency Frontiers and Observed Performance Points: Industrial 



























Source: Author’s estimations. 
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Figure 16. Estimated Efficiency Frontiers and Observed Performance Points: Emerging 
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Source: Author’s estimations. 
 
Figure 17. Estimated Efficiency Frontiers and Observed Performance Points: All 


























Source: Author’s estimations. 
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Figure 18. Estimated Efficiency Frontiers and Observed Performance Points: Industrial 



























Source: Author’s estimations. 
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Figure 19. Estimated Efficiency Frontiers and Observed Performance Points: Emerging 
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Source: Author’s estimations. 
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Figure 20. Estimated Efficiency Frontiers and Observed Performance Points: 

























Source: Author’s estimations. 
 
Inflation Variability   59 
Figure 21. Estimated Efficiency Frontiers and Observed Performance Points: All 






















Source: Author’s estimations. 
 
Figure 22. Estimated Efficiency Frontiers and Observed Performance Points: Industrial 




















Source: Author’s estimations. 
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Figure 23. Estimated Efficiency Frontiers and Observed Performance Points: Emerging 
























Source: Author’s estimations. 
 
Figure 24. Estimated Efficiency Frontiers and Observed Performance Points: Stationary 























Source: Author’s estimations. 
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Figure 25. Estimated Efficiency Frontiers and Observed Performance Points: Industrial 




















Source: Author’s estimations. 
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Figure 26. Estimated Efficiency Frontiers and Observed Performance Points: Emerging 
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Figure 27. Median Absolute Deviations of Inflation Rate from Inflation Target or from 
Trend in Inflation Targeters and Nontargeters, 1989–2004a 
 
A. First inflation deviation measure (ID1) 
 













B. Second inflation deviation measure (ID2) 
 












Source: Author's calculations, based on data from Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development, Main Economic Indicators; IMF; and central banks. 
 
a. See the text for definitions of inflation deviation measures ID1 and ID2.   64 
 
Figure 28. Estimated Coefficient of Inflation Targeting for Alternative Values of the HP 
Filter Smoothing Parametera  
 
A. First inflation deviation measure (ID1) 
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B. Second inflation deviation measure (ID2) 
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Source: Author’s estimations. 
 
a. The reported coefficients correspond to the IT dummy coefficients from the regressions 
reported in column 1 of tables 11 and 12. 